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We study the international propagation of financial conditions from the 
United States to global financial markets. The impact is highly 
heterogeneous alongside the quantiles of the distribution of the two major 
funding sources, credit and equity. Indeed, it is greater on the lower 
quantiles, which means that analogous to vulnerable growth episodes, 
examined by the past literature, there exist as well vulnerable funding 
periods of a global scale, originated from financial weakness in the US. 
These episodes are related to downside risk in terms of credit creation and 
firms’ market value around the world. Our estimates differentiate between 
first and second moment (i.e. uncertainty) shocks to financial conditions. 
This distinction proves to be relevant as it uncovers a complex propagation 
of shocks via different economic channels. On the one hand, credit growth 
largely responds to first moment shocks of US financial conditions four 
quarters after their occurrence, which is consistent with a credit view 
explanation of the transmission. On the other hand, stock markets react 
more sensitively and rapidly (mainly within a quarter) to second moment 
shocks, which can be theoretically associated with a portfolio channel 
underlying the shocks spread. We also document a heterogeneous impact 
across countries. In the case of credit growth this heterogeneity is better 
explained by the size or depth of the markets, while in the case of stock 
markets, the explanation is rooted on the strength of the financial 
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An influential group of recent studies has documented significant predictive power of financial 
conditions on real economic activity during distressed macroeconomic scenarios, that is, on 
the left (and negative) tail of the GDP growth distribution. This literature, pioneered by the 
works of Giglio et al. (2016) and Adrian et al. (2018, 2019) has coined the term Growth at Risk 
(GaR), which echoes the concept of Value at Risk, widely used and understood by regulators 
and practitioners everywhere for at least two decades1 . In fact, the indicator has gained 
popularity among international regulators to the point of becoming part of the toolkit of 
central banks and financial supervisors available to monitor financial stability. Hence, 
estimating and reporting the lowest quantiles of the GDP distribution, predicted by financial 
conditions, one or several quarters ahead, has become standard practice (Prasad et al., 2019). 
This practice, which originated as a domestic economy exercise, in which the aim was to 
predict the GDP of the US with an index of financial conditions of the same country, usually 
the National Financial Conditions Index (NFCI)2, quickly became global in nature, so the 
ability of financial conditions to predict the left tail of economic activity in a relatively large set 
of different countries has been examined and evaluated as well (e.g. Brownlees and Souza, 
2020; Arrigoni et al. 2020).  
We contribute to this literature in three ways. i) First, unlike previous studies that examine the 
effect of financial conditions on international real economic activity, we focus on a crucial 
intermediate step:  We study how financial conditions in the US impact funding markets (credit 
and stocks) on a large set of countries around the world, under macro-financial distress 
scenarios. In other words, we focus on vulnerable funding instead of vulnerable growth. This 
intermediate step is crucial because financial shocks do not transit directly, or in a vacuum, 
from the US to the global economic activity. On the contrary, US financial conditions mainly 
impact global economic activity by deteriorating funding opportunities for households and 
firms around the world. This distinction is also important from a policy perspective, because it 
is at this intermediate financial level where policies that seek to safeguard the financial stability 
                                                        
1 See as well on the vulnerable growth literature the works by Kiley (2018), Boyarchenko et al. (2019), Loria et al. 
(2019), Figueres and Jarociński (2020), and Delle Monache et al. (2020).  
2 The NFCI calculated by the Chicago’s Fed captures financial risk, leverage, and credit quality within a single 
indicator. It offers a comprehensive view of U.S. financial conditions in money debt and equity markets alongside 
both, traditional and shadow banking systems.  
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of domestic economies can expect to exert some type of mitigation of the adverse effects of 
the large and negative financial shocks that may emerge from the United States market. In this 
respect we document a larger and more significant impact of US Financial conditions on the 
lowest quantiles of credit and stock prices on a global scale than on the central quantiles. ii) 
Second, also unlike the previous literature, we acknowledge that financial conditions must be 
understood in a broader sense that includes not only changes in the first moment of financial 
conditions (as measured by the NFCI) but also changes in the second moment of financial 
conditions (which are better approximated by the index of financial uncertainty proposed by 
Ludvigson et al. (2021)). First and second moment shocks impact in dissimilar ways global 
funding. On the one hand, credit growth largely responds to first moment shocks in US 
financial conditions four quarters after their origination, which is consistent with a reduction of 
international funding sources for financing domestic investment, and therefore with the 
international credit view for the transmission of financial shocks across different countries. On the 
other hand, stock markets react more sensitively and rapidly (mainly within a quarter) to 
second moment shocks. This latter effect is more consistent with an expectations channel of 
the transmission of shocks, which in turn is associated with likely portfolio rebalancing by 
international portfolio holders, following an increase of US financial uncertainty. We 
empirically show that both channels, the credit view and the portfolio view are complementary, and 
both are necessary to understand how financial conditions in the US spillover to the rest of the 
world. iii) Third, we examine what is the most likely reason for a given country’s vulnerability 
to changes in the financial conditions of the US. Namely, we test whether such vulnerability 
can be explained by the size or depth of a country’s financial market, as it can be inferred from 
previous studies (e.g., Alfaro et al., 2004; Kalemli-Özcan, 2019), or if the explanation is rooted 
on the strength of the financial connectedness of a given country with the US. We show that 
the answer depends on whether we focus on credit or stock markets. In the case of credit 
markets, the most persistent and negative outcomes in terms of vulnerability are clearly more 
associated with the size or depth of the market while, in the case of stock markets, vulnerable 
funding episodes are associated with financial closeness to the US. This result sheds new lights 
on the problem compared to the previous literature, which does not employ the large number 
of countries that we consider, and also does not focus on the macro-financially distressed 
scenarios when funding is vulnerable. 
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To achieve our objectives we analyze vulnerable funding around the world. Vulnerable funding 
consists of two indicators: Credit at Risk (CaR) and Equity at Risk (EaR). The former refers to 
the impact of financial conditions of the US (including financial uncertainty) on the lowest 
quantiles of real credit growth and the second, on the lowest quantiles of the stock market 
prices. Loans and shares are the two main funding sources used by corporations to finance 
their operations, especially their investment (Parson and Titman, 2008; Fama and French, 
2012). Therefore, evaluating the impact of financial conditions of the world’s largest economy, 
on the lowest quantiles of the growth of credit and stock prices of the rest of the world is a 
crucial gap in the literature that we aim to remedy. Our approach intends to be comprehensive, 
thus we include more than 40 countries in our estimations, with information spanning six 
decades (from 1960 to 2019) in most of the cases. Our data set consists of economies in all 
stages of development and comprises all sorts of recessionary and non-recessionary periods. 
To the best of our knowledge no previous article within the vulnerable growth literature has 
relied on such a large data set to back-up its claims.  
Methodologically speaking, thanks to the multinational point of view that we adopt, we are 
able to circumvent two controversial issues regarding the identification of the estimated effects 
in the vulnerable growth literature. The first one related to the lack of relevant controls on 
economic activity, required to assess the causal effect of financial conditions on future growth, 
and the second related to the presence of global macroeconomic and financial cycles which 
need to be considered when one estimates the propagation of shocks on a global scale. 
Regarding the former Reichlin et al. (2020) and Plagborg-Møller et al. (2020) emphasize that 
the predictive power of financial conditions seems to disappear once the model controls for 
(enough) real-economy variables. Therefore, the deterioration of financial conditions might be 
more of an endogenous response of the system than of an exogenous shock that deteriorates 
future real economic activity. In other words, by lacking enough controls on real variables, the 
vulnerable growth literature might be overstating the true impact of financial conditions on 
future economic activity. Nevertheless, recent proposals by Reichlin et al. (2020), Plagborg-
Møller et al. (2020), and the Adjusted-NFCI provided by the Chicago’s Fed on its web site, all 
of which seek to isolate the dynamics of financial variables from the dynamics of real 
economic variables, before estimating financial conditions, are not free of criticisms either. In 
short, if unobservable financial conditions are defined as a factor conditioned on the previous 
estimation of a main economic activity component (i.e. basically the effect of financial 
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conditions reduces to a residual of the unexplained variation of real economic variables), we 
are implicitly assuming in the estimation of the financial factor, that the real and financial sides 
of the economy can be in fact pristinely separated in such a way. Thus, the identification issue 
is translated from the estimation of the impact to the construction of the financial conditions 
factor, but the main controversy remains unsolved, whether the financial shock is an 
endogenous response of the system or an exogenous shock, presumably with effective 
forecasting power. This identification issue is related to the problem of identifying the effects 
of real and financial uncertainty on the real economy (Ludvigson et al., 2021; Carriero et al., 
2020), and also to the long-winded controversy in the macroeconomics literature that revolves 
about the extent to which we can isolate the effects of policy variables, like the interest rate, on 
the real economy series3.  
Our identification assumption is less controversial, owing to the fact that we do not assume 
any behavior about real or financial variables in our model. Instead, we assume that the US 
financial conditions are exogenous to the domestic economy series included in our data set. 
That is, that the US is the origin of financial shocks and not the other way around. Indeed, this 
assumption is backed-up by recent literature that documents the dominant role of the US 
economy relative to other countries, and in particular its monetary policy, which significantly 
influences the commonality of business and financial cycles around the world (Ammer et al., 
2018; Jordà et al., 2019; Miranda-Agripino and Rey, 2020 a,b). We also do not evaluate the 
interaction between real-economy and financial variables, because we estimate the effects of 
financial conditions of the US on stocks and credit of other countries, which are also financial 
variables. However, our main theoretical motivation does come from the theoretically and 
empirically grounded consensus in the literature, reached after the Great Recession, revised for 
instance by Isohätälä et al. (2016), Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2016) and Gertler and 
Gilchrist (2018). This literature emphasizes the role of borrowers’ balance sheets in 
constraining access to credit when capital markets are imperfect or the nonlinear amplification 
mechanisms that characterize financial crises. The strength of a bank’s balance sheet affects 
access to credit and thus the possibility to spend on the side of firms and households. In turn, 
financial collapses are characterized by borrower’s balance sheets severely contracted, which 
lead to significant disruptions of credit flows. In this way, important declines in spending and 
                                                        
3 See Nakamura and Steinsson (2018) for a recent summary on the non-neutrality of monetary policy. 
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economic activity are expected to follow. All these mechanisms place the role of funding as a 
priority to understand crises and carry out stabilization policies.  
Regarding the second identification issue, note that moving from the domestic economy to 
international grounds opens the door to another problem related to the identification of 
international shocks. Namely, US shocks might be correlated with global financial and 
economic activity shocks which cannot be ruled out only by stressing out the dominance of 
the US economy. This point has been explored for instance by Chudik and Pesaran (2015) and 
Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2020). Lacking to control for these common factors likely render omitted-
variables bias to the estimated effects on a domestic-economy level. This point has been 
mainly overlooked by the extant literature on (international) vulnerable growth, and the 
literature on the transmissions of (international) credit imbalances, which have mainly focused 
on a few number of countries or even on individual countries using granular micro-data.  
Our study is also related to the large corpus of theoretical and empirical literature that has 
expanded the credit-channel to international grounds, and therefore, has contributed to the 
explanation of the transmission of financial shocks across the world economy (Peek and 
Rosengren, 1997; Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011; Ivashina et al., 2015; Bruno and Shin, 2015; 
Choi, 2018; Choi et al., 2018; Baskaya et al., 2017; Gete and Melkadse, 2018; Braüning and 
Ivashina, 2020a; Di Giovanni et al., 2029; among others). We revise this literature and connect 
it with our contributions in the next section, which in short aim to help regulators to foresee 
future risks to funding opportunities for domestic investment and consumption, and therefore 
to economic activity, after a financial shock to the US economy has been observed (as 
occurred for instance during the Great Recession). We also seek to document the main way in 
which vulnerable growth occurs, which is precisely through the propagation of financial shocks 
across the global financial markets, i.e., via vulnerable funding.  
The rest of this document is organized as follows: Section two briefly revises two perspectives 
in the literature that can explain the transmission of financial conditions of the US to the 
international funding markets, namely the credit view and the portfolio view and also revise 
the two main explanations underlying vulnerable funding, market depth and market 
connectedness. The third section consists of our methodology. Section four describes our data 
and sources, and presents details about the construction of our macroeconomic and financial 
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global factors. Section five contains our main empirical results and discussion. Section six 
concludes. 
2. International spread of US financial conditions  
In addition to the vulnerable growth literature summarized in the introduction, our study is 
related to two different sets of studies: Those who emphasize the channels through which 
financial shocks transit from a central economy (generally the US) to the rest of the global 
markets, and those who examine the macroeconomic determinants of financial vulnerability to 
external shocks. Both literatures are too rich as to be summarized in this subsection, so we 
only focus on those studies that directly provide a baseline for understanding our main results. 
In the former group of studies we find a subset of articles that highlight the role of credit in 
the international propagation of financial shocks, which we label as the credit view, and a second 
subset that emphasizes the transmission of financial shocks trough expectations, which we 
include in the portfolio view of the transmission of shocks.  
In the second group of studies we find a great majority of articles that have pointed-out to size 
and depth of the financial markets as the main determinants of financial vulnerability to 
external shocks, hence they are labeled as the financial development determinant, and a second 
subset that instead has stressed out the importance of financial connectedness across the 
global financial markets as the main explanatory factor, labeled the financial connectedness 
determinant. Both channels and determinants are important for our different definitions of 
financial conditions, based on first and second moment indicators. The classification does not 
pretend to be either exhaustive or exclusive. Indeed, in the referenced studies the channels and 
determinants are closely interviewed. For instance, as highlighted by Alfaro et al. (2007) the 
role of local financial markets is crucial in enabling foreign direct investment. The more 
developed the local financial markets, the easier it is for credit-constrained entrepreneurs to 
start their own business. Large varieties of intermediate goods imply positive spillovers to the 
final goods sector and, as a consequence, financial markets allow the backward linkages 
between foreign and domestic firms to turn into FDI spillovers.  
Hence, our revision is more oriented to serve as a starting point to understand the empirical 
results in the next section, and how they relate to our working hypothesis explained in the 
introduction about the existence of vulnerable funding episodes following first and second 
moment shocks to financial conditions in the US. 
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2.1. The channels 
A. The international credit view  
According to this literature external factors, such as the US interest rates and global financial 
conditions, are key determinants of capital flows, especially in the short run. Which is 
important because as highlighted by Kalemli-Özcan et al. (2020), there is evidence about a 
strong association between capital flows, GDP volatility, and financial crises. This general view 
consists of understanding that international creditors may react to a change of financial 
conditions, including monetary policy stances in their original economies, by reducing their 
exposition to foreign markets, to satisfy risk-taking constraints on their international credit 
portfolio holdings. Thus, as emphasized by Braüning and Ivashina (2020a), some intended 
consequences of the US monetary within its domestic economy, may end up having intended 
consequences on a global basis (i.e. spillover of “prudent risk-taking” or “productive risk-
taking”).  
In these lines, Bruno and Shin (2015) highlight the role of financing costs of banks, which are 
closely tied to the reference policy rate chosen by the central bank. If funding costs affect 
decisions on how much exposure to take on, monetary policy will then affect the economy 
through greater risk-taking by the banking sector. Di Giovanni et al (2019) also document that 
an easing in global financial conditions leads to lower borrowing costs and to an increase in 
local lending. The shocks on credit can potentially transit via international banks as in Cetorelli 
and Goldberg (2011), foreign banks lending elsewhere as in Braüning and Ivashina (2020b) and 
Ivashina et al. (2015), via domestic banks borrowing from foreign banks and global investors 
over the global financial cycle as in Baskaya et al (2017) or even via credit trade by 
multinational establishments (Lin and Yee, 2018).  
B. The international portfolio view  
Even if we abstract from the direct link that provides lending, it could also be the case that if a 
peak of uncertainty in the US, associated to a worsening of financial conditions, is interpreted 
as signal of future higher domestic vulnerability in other countries, such an increase may lead 
to higher precautionary savings which do not remain within the domestic economies but that 
instead flow abroad, reducing domestic demand (Fernández-Villaverde et al., 2011) and 
similarly to a contraction of banks’ credit supply after facing greater uncertainty, which can be 
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rationalized by the arguments explored by Bordo et al. (2016), Valencia (2016), Caldara et al. 
(2016), Alessandri and Mumtaz (2019) and Alessandri and Botero (2020).  
We contribute to the previous literature on the transmission channels in two ways: first, we 
focus on the most vulnerable market scenarios, automatically identified by estimating Credit at 
Risk and Equity at Risk statistics, which has not been done before (all the aforementioned 
literature focus on the average scenarios, and most of them on a few number or individual 
countries). In this way, we acknowledge the non-linear dimension emphasized by the 
consensus of the macroeconomic literature in recent years, necessary to explain economic 
collapses (Isohätälä et al., 2016; Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2016; Gertler and Gilchrist, 
2018). Second, we jointly analyze the impacts of first moment shocks proxied by the NFCI, 
and second moment financial conditions proxied by the index of financial uncertainty of 
Ludvigson et al. (2021). Thus we are able to disentangle the whole effects of financial 
conditions on the global economy. All in all, our results emphasize the role of the portfolio 
view for the propagation of second moment financial condition shocks and of the credit view 
to understand the propagation of first moment financial conditions shocks.    
2.1. The Determinants 
A. Size and depth of the domestic financial market   
The previous literature has reported an asymmetric impact of global financial conditions on 
economic activity of emerging and advanced economies. For example, Carrièrre-Swallow and 
Céspedes (2013) find that in comparison to the U.S. and other developed countries, emerging 
economies suffer much more severe falls in investment and private consumption following an 
exogenous uncertainty shock. They present evidence on the correlation of the dynamics of 
investment and consumption with the depth of financial markets. The authors emphasize the 
role of financial institutions and argue that the lack of development of local financial markets 
can limit the economy’s ability to take advantage of potential FDI spillovers.  Alfaro et al 
(2004) evaluate the various links among FDI, financial markets, and economic growth. They 
conclude that FDI alone plays an unclear role for economic growth. Instead it is well-
developed financial markets and institutions that enable a country to take advantage from 
increases in foreign investment. Kalemli-Özcan (2019) shows that changes in US monetary 
policy affect capital flows in and out of emerging markets more than they do in advanced 
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economies, since the capital flows of emerging markets are more risk sensitive, and US policy 
affects the risk sentiments of global investors.  
Other authors such as Braüning and Ivashina (2020a) document that global bank flows driven 
by U.S. monetary policy affect credit conditions in emerging markets, at the firm level, which 
confirms that the contraction of credit by global banks is not compensated by an increase in 
credit by local banks. On the contrary it leads to a general credit contraction, an increasing in 
interest rate spreads, and finally to a lower probability of refinancing.  
The same narrative can be tracked in the previous literature regarding the transmission of 
international stock market shocks to domestic economies across the world. For instance, 
Bhattarai et al (2020) document that unanticipated changes in US uncertainty have significant 
effects on financial and macroeconomic emerging market economies. The transmission is 
traced back to a depreciation of the local currency of domestic economies, which leads to a 
decline in local stock markets, increases long-term interest rate spreads in relation to the US, 
and is followed by a decrease in capital inflows into the domestic economies. 
B. Financial connectedness with the US   
It is important to think of this literature as a complement of the studies in literal A, which 
emphasizes the role of size and depth of the domestic markets that receive the shock, instead 
of as an alternative explanation. To illustrate this point, Fink and Schüler (2015) emphasize the 
importance of financial linkages with the US rather than via bilateral trade to explain the 
propagation of financial condition shocks across the global economy. However, precisely for 
this reason the transmission to emerging market economies (EME) may occur to a different 
extent than the transmission to advanced economies. Fink and Schüler (2015) find that, 
indeed, an adverse shock to the overall US financial system dries up capital flows from the US 
to the EME and that this decline in cross-border lending results in tighter financing conditions 
for the EME. 
Alfaro and Chen (2012), using granular data investigate the way in which multinationals around 
the world responded to the 2008 crisis relative to local firms. They explore three channels 
through which FDI affects establishment performance: production linkages, financial linkages, 
and multinational networks. These authors’ results point-out to an important although 
heterogeneous role of FDI flows at explaining multinational firms’ performance during the 
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Global Financial Crisis. They emphasized both the role of FDI linkages in the international 
transmission of shocks and the important interaction of the various facets that determine such 
transmissions, from financial constraints considerations to the engagement of some firms with 
vertical production linkages.  
Lin and Ye (2018) explore a trade credit channel through which FDI firms can propagate 
global liquidity shocks to host countries, despite these host countries implementing tight 
controls on portfolio flows. This is important because in practice, while many developing 
countries impose tight restrictions on non-FDI flows, they are significantly open to FDI 
inflows. These authors show that indeed a positive global liquidity shock eases raising 
international funds for FDI firms. This in turn, strengthens FDI firms’ advantage in trade 
credit provision to local downstream firms. In short, there exists a trade credit channel through 
which FDI firms can propagate global liquidity shocks to host economies despite the presence 
of tight controls on non-FDI financial flows.  
In terms of contributions, our multi-country and comprehensive approach, allows us to test 
what factor explains better the heterogeneous dynamic of Credit at Risk and Equity at Risk 
indicators that we estimate for the cross-section of countries. We find that vulnerability of 
credit markets is better explained by the size or depth of credit markets while financial 
connectedness to the US, measured as the relative importance of US foreign direct investment 
to a country’s GDP, better explains vulnerability of stock markets.  
3. Methodology 
To avoid the criticisms mentioned in the introduction regarding the likely endogeneity of 
financial first and second moment shocks with respect to credit and stock markets within a 
single economy, we estimate multi-country factor augmented quantile-regression models. Our 
models directly consider the influence of common real and financial factors of a global nature, 
on the domestic economic series. Thus, they allow us to better isolate the causal effects of 
financial conditions on funding markets around the world.   
Our base-line specification for each country i is given by Equation 1:  
𝑦 , (𝜏) = 𝛼 (𝜏) + 𝛽 (𝜏)𝑦 , + 𝛽 (𝜏)𝑢𝑠. 𝑓𝑐 + 𝛿 (𝜏)′𝑋 ,   (1) 
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where, i = 1, … N , refers to the country,  h = {0,1,4}, to the forecasting- horizon, and τ =
{0.05,0.10.0.20,0.50} to the quantile of the dependent variable. 𝑦 ,  is either the quarterly 
change of real credit growth in logarithms (Credit at Risk) or the quarterly change of the stock 
price index in logarithms (Equity at Risk), at time horizon 𝑡 + ℎ. On its side, 𝑢𝑠. 𝑓𝑐  is the US 
financial condition indicator, which can be either the NFCI of the Chicago’s Fed or the 
Financial Uncertainty Index provided by Ludvigson et al. (2021), publicly available on the we 
page of the authors. 𝑋 consists of a global macroeconomic factor and a global financial factor. 
𝛼 (𝜏), 𝛽 (𝜏), 𝛽 (𝜏) and 𝛿(𝜏) denote the parameters corresponding to the τ-th quantile.  
We emphasize that 𝑦 , (𝜏) is a conditional quantile of the response variable, and for this 
reason there is not a random term in equation 1. In other words, 𝑦 , (𝜏) characterizes 𝑦 ,  
but it is deterministic in nature. Nevertheless, we can present Equation 1 alternatively in the 
following way: 
𝑦 , = 𝛼 (𝜏) + 𝛽 (𝜏)𝑦 , + 𝛽 (𝜏)𝑢𝑠. 𝑓𝑐 + 𝛿 (𝜏)′𝑋 + 𝜀 , (𝜏) ,          (2) 
where 𝜀 (𝜏) is a random noise that is assumed to follow the following quantile-restriction 
𝑃 𝜀 , (𝜏) ≤ 0 𝛼 (𝜏) + 𝛽 (𝜏)𝑦 , + 𝛽 (𝜏)𝑢𝑠. 𝑓𝑐 + 𝛿 (𝜏)′𝑋 = 𝜏. The presentation of the 
model in equation 2 emphasizes the factor structure of the CaR and EaR statistics. The model 
for each country is estimated using individual conditional quantile regressions as proposed by 
Koenker and Basett (1978), but 𝑦 ,  in all countries are a function of common factors, 
𝑢𝑠. 𝑓𝑐  and 𝑋 , which do not have cross-sectional variation but only vary through time, via a 
country-specific intercept (𝛼 ) and country-specific slope coefficients (𝛽 , 𝛽 , 𝛿 ). All the 
variables were normalized before estimation to have zero mean and unitary variance. In this 
way, we are able to compare the magnitude of the effects across different countries. 
The model in Equation 1 expands a traditional conditional mean regression, in the sense that it 
explains the whole conditional time-series distribution of credit growth and stock returns. In 
particular,  𝑦 , (𝜏) solves the following optimization problem: 
𝑦 , (𝜏) = argmin (𝜏)𝐸 𝜌 𝑦 , (𝜏) − 𝑦 , (𝜏) ,                    (3) 
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where (𝜏) = 𝛼0(𝜏), 𝛽0(𝜏), 𝛽1(𝜏) , 𝛿(𝜏) ,  𝑦𝑖,𝑡+ℎ(𝜏) = 𝛼0𝑖(𝜏) + 𝛽0𝑖(𝜏)𝑦𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽1𝑖(𝜏)𝑢𝑠. 𝑓𝑐𝑡 +
𝛿𝑖(𝜏)′𝑋𝑡 , and 𝜌 (·) is a loss function, given by 𝜌 (𝜀) = (1 − 𝜏)𝐼{ }|𝜀| + 𝜏𝐼{ }|𝜀|, with 
𝐼{ } taking the value of 1 when the subscript is true and 0 otherwise. As it is well known, the 
mathematical formulation in Equation 3 leads to the solution of a linear programming 
optimization problem that we have omitted here. Its basic structure and the counterpart 
algorithm solution can be found in Koenker (2005). 
Quantile regressions have been employed in the factor models literature, since at least Ando 
and Tsay (2011). We estimate the global factors using PCA, following the tradition of the 
factor literature, as described for example by Bai and Ng (2008, 2020) and Stock and Watson 
(2010), and also the approach of aforementioned studies on GaR. An alternative to Equation 1 
would be incorporating the global factors as done by Chudik and Pesaran (2015) using the 
cross-sectional means for the variables in the data set, and this would result in a quantile factor 
model in the form of Harding et al. (2020). Both, these authors’ approach and our approach 
are inspired by the necessity to incorporate common factors to model the dynamics of the 
cross-sectional units, which are fundamental when conducting multinational comparisons, in 
order to reduce the risk of omitting relevant confounding variations.  
Note as well that we do not have a balanced-panel (and we do not require it), our approach is 
more flexible than that, in the sense that our factors use all the available cross-sectional units at 
each period in the sample, but the country-specific estimates depend on the number of time-
series units available for each country, which in most cases run from 1960:1Q to 2019:4Q, and 
only in two cases consist of shorter samples (which are indicated in the results).  
4. Data 
Our dataset includes a set of macroeconomic and financial variables for advanced and 
emerging economies and US data on financial conditions. Specifically, we use a long quarterly 
data panel constructed and provided by Monnet and Puy (2019), which covers real Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), credit, consumer prices, nominal stock prices, and sovereign bond 
yields for advanced and emerging countries over the whole post-war period. Compared to 
other similar sources, such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) or the Bank of International Settlements (BIS), the coverage gains for these data is 
around 20% to 30% for advanced economies, and more 100% for emerging economies. More 
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specifically, real GDP is available for 37 countries, real credit for 45 countries, consumer prices 
for 48, nominal stock prices for 25 countries and bond yields for 18, with a sample size that 
ranges between 1950-Q1 and 2019-Q4 per country4. We restrict our sample to start in 1960-
1Q because of poor data quality for the earlier periods (we observed very extreme values and 
large volatility).  For the purposes of our analysis, we transform our variables in order to 
achieve stationarity before estimation. Table A2 in the Appendix shows the transformations 
applied to each series and Figure A1 plots both the untransformed and transformed series with 
their associated unit root tests5. 
As for US data on financial conditions, we use either the National Financial Condition Index6 
or the financial uncertainty indicator proposed by Ludvigson et al. (2021)7. On the one hand, 
following the seminal work of Adrian et al. (2019), NFCI is considered to be one of the most 
relevant predictors of the lower conditional quantiles of output growth for the US (e.g., 
Arrigoni et al., 2020; Brownlees and Souza, 2020; Beutel et al., 2020; Deuskar et al., 2020). 
Based on Brave and Butters (2012), the NFCI is a weighted average of 105 measures of 
financial activity, each one scaled to have zero mean and one standard deviation. Positive 
NFCI values imply that US financial conditions are tighter than average. Since the NFCI has 
weekly periodicity, for our analysis we aggregated it by taking the quarter averages for the 
overall sample, starting at 1971-Q1. This implies that for our econometric estimations that 
include this variable, the sample is reduced to around 200 observations. On the other hand, the 
financial uncertainty index is constructed by Ludvigson et al. (2021) using a rich-dataset of 
variables that fully characterize US financial markets. The authors of the index estimate a 
factor model for the large-dataset, and predict each variable using their latent factor structure. 
Then, they estimate the time-varying conditional volatility of each series residuals and average 
across all of them, in order to get the financial uncertainty indicator.   
As stated above, in our estimations we include a global macroeconomic factor and a global 
financial factor to control for the commonality of business and financial cycles previously 
                                                        
4 See Table A1 in the Appendix for details on data availability, Table A2 for details on transformations of the 
variables, and Table A3 for details on summary statistics. 
5 We test for unit roots using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF).  
6  The NFCI is constructed and published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and it is available at: 
https://www.chicagofed.org/publications/nfci/index 
7 The Financial Uncertainty indicator is available for the US in the web page of one of its authors, at: 
https://www.sydneyludvigson.com/macro-and-financial-uncertainty-indexes 
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emphasized by the literature. The central idea of our approach is to summarize fluctuations in 
macroeconomic and financial variables for a large and heterogeneous panel of advanced and 
emerging economies by using factor models. In particular, we estimate two global factors: the 
first factor, which we refer to as the global financial factor (N=89; T=240, from 1960Q1 to 
2019Q4) contains real credit growth, stock returns and changes in sovereign bond yields; and 
the second factor, which we refer to as the global macroeconomic factor (N=174; T=240, 
from 1960Q1 to 2019Q4), includes real GDP growth, inflation, on top of the above-
mentioned variables.  
We estimate these common factors by a two-step procedure that combines first-step 
estimation via Principal Component Analysis (PCA)8 with the Kalman filter, where the latter is 
used to compute recursively the expected value of the common factors, which is iterated until 
convergence of the Expected-Maximization (EM) algorithm (Doz et al., 2012). This procedure 
is especially relevant for our work as we deal with some missing data for specific countries at 
the end of the sample. We compute the factors from the stationary variables and assume that 
can be represented by a VAR(1) process. However, the two factors (global macroeconomic 
and financial) estimated using the two –steps algorithm are very similar to the ones computed 
by direct estimation via PCA, thus we opt for reporting only the latter in our results (see Table 
A3). 
Figure 1 plots the NFCI jointly with the global macroeconomic and financial factors over the 
sample period. Consistent with Miranda-Aggrapino and Rey (2020), we find that our global 
factors point-out to the existence of a global cycle that commoves with the U.S. recession 
periods as identified by the NBER (red shaded areas). These global factors, the NFCI and the 
financial uncertainty index share a pronounced contemporaneous common component, 
especially around the global financial crisis. In this period, we notice a sharp movement of the 
global factors and a tightening in US financial conditions. This fact suggests that, in order to 
explore the international transmission of financial fragility in the US to the conditional 
distribution of global credit markets and stock markets, we should control for the 
contemporaneous global and financial cycles. Thus, we should focus on the additional 
“marginal” information provided by the indicator of financial fragility in the US. Additionally, 
                                                        
8 In order to estimate principal components in the first stage, missing values are imputed by the respective 
country-specific variable’s average. 
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we observe that the NFCI and the financial uncertainty index share some common spikes, e.g. 
around the 1973-1975 recession due to the oil crisis coupled with the stock market crash, or 
during the global financial crisis, but appear to be capturing different aspects of US financial 
fragility. In particular, the NFCI is more volatile and moved up notably during the recession 
periods in the early 80s, while the uncertainty index stayed subdued over the same period. 
However, the opposite happened in the late 1990s and during the collapse of the speculative 
dot-com bubble in the early 2000s. Moreover, during 2018-2019 the uncertainty index rose 
significantly while the NFCI remained stable.  
Figure 1.Global factors and US financial conditions 
 
Sources: Chicago National Financial Condition Index (NFCI) and author’s computation. 
Note: Standardized variables. Time span 1971Q1 to 2019Q4. Red shaded area represents NBER recessions at the 
end of the period. 
 
Finally, to assess cross-country heterogeneity, we construct three variables related to the size of 
credit and stock markets, respectively, and financial interconnection with the US. Specifically, 
we measure the size of credit markets by the annual average of the credit to GDP ratio for 
each country and the size of stock markets by the annual average of the market capitalization 
to GDP ratio. This data has been collected from the World Bank database9 and, in both cases, 
the time spam goes from 1960 to 2019. Financial interconnection with the US is measured by 
the total direct investment of the US as a percentage of the country’s GDP (for the sample 
period 1989 to 2019). To this end, we compute for each country the maximum value of US 
                                                        
9 Credit refers to financial resources (loans, securities, and other claims) provided to the private sector by banks. 
Market capitalization is the share price times the number of shares outstanding for listed domestic companies. 
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investment inflows relative to its GDP10 . We use historical data on US direct investment 
abroad from the National Bureau of Economic Research and nominal GDP from the 
International Monetary Fund statistics.11  
 
5. Results 
First, we present our estimation results of the impact of US financial conditions shocks on 
credit growth and stock returns. We distinguish between changes in the first moment of 
financial conditions (as measured by the NFCI) and changes in the second moment of 
financial conditions (as measured by the index of financial uncertainty proposed by Ludvigson 
et al. (2021)). Then, we assess the heterogeneity on the vulnerability of credit and stock 
markets to US financial conditions across countries. To this end, first, we graphically show our 
results sorting the countries according to different measures related with the size of credit and 
stock markets, and the relative importance of US foreign investment for each country. Finally, 
we carry out cross-sectional regressions that use as input the quantile slopes of CaR and EaR 
estimated in the first round of regressions, and as explanatory variables the ones mentioned 
above.  
5.1. Impact of NFCI shocks on global markets  
Table 1 summarizes the estimation results for real credit growth as the dependent variable for 
quantiles 𝜏 = {0.05,0.10.0.20,0.50} and for forecasting- horizons ℎ = {0,1,4}. We run two 
different regressions. The first one only includes the NFCI while the second one controls for 
the global financial and macroeconomic factors. The table reports the following information: 
the first and last quartiles of the distribution of estimated coefficients (q25-q75), the 
proportion of countries for which the variable is statistically significant at 90% confidence level 
(Sig.) and, for the NFCI, additionally it is showed the proportion of countries that displays 




                                                        
10 Results are robust when we use the average instead of the maximum value. 
11 See Table A5 in the Appendix for information on these variables. 
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Table 1: Quantile regressions, Impact of NFCI on real credit growth (CaR) 
Note: Sig. denotes proportion of countries for which the variable is statistically significant at 90% confidence 
level; q25-q75 shows the first and third quartiles of the estimated coefficients. Intercepts are omitted in the table. 
Standard errors are based on bootstrap with 1000 replications. Sample: 1971Q1 to 2019Q4 for 44 countries, 
except for Bolivia (to 2019Q3), Iceland (to 2018Q4) and Taiwan (to 2018Q4). 
 𝝉 = 
0.05 0.1 0.2 0.5 
Regressions for 𝒉 = 𝟎 
 US financial conditions indicator 
𝑁𝐹𝐶𝐼  q25-q75 [-0.32;0.07] [-0.22;0.02] [-0.14;0.05] [-0.05;0.08] 
Sig.<0 0.25 0.16 0.14 0.07 
US financial conditions indicator + Global factors 
𝑁𝐹𝐶𝐼  q25-q75 [-0.25;0.02] [-0.24;0.01] [-0.16;0.02] [-0.06;0.07] 
Sig.<0 0.18 0.14 0.25 0.07 
𝐺_𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙  q25-q75 [0.02;0.56] [0.00;0.56] [0.03;0.52] [0.13;0.52] 
Sig. 0.25 0.34 0.45 0.5 
𝐺_𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐  q25-q75 [-0.08;0.63] [-0.1;0.52] [-0.05;0.53] [0.11;0.54] 
Sig. 0.27 0.3 0.45 0.5 
Regressions for 𝒉 = 𝟏 
 US financial conditions indicator  
𝑦  q25-q75 [0.05;0.32] [0.07;0.36] [0.06;0.35] [0.09;0.43] 
Sig. 0.30 0.48 0.59 0.70 
𝑁𝐹𝐶𝐼  q25-q75 [-0.28;-0.02] [-0.24;-0.06] [-0.19;-0.01] [-0.08;0.02] 
Sig.<0 0.23 0.25 0.30 0.07 
 US financial conditions indicator + Global factors  
𝑦  q25-q75 [0.06;0.30] [0.05;0.35] [0.09;0.37] [0.09;0.43] 
Sig. 0.36 0.48 0.57 0.68 
𝑁𝐹𝐶𝐼  q25-q75 [-0.26;-0.02] [-0.24;-0.03] [-0.17;-0.05] [-0.06;0.06] 
Sig.<0 0.16 0.27 0.25 0.02 
𝐺_𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙  q25-q75 [-0.45;0.37] [-0.27;0.23] [-0.16;0.17] [-0.08;0.19] 
Sig. 0.30 0.23 0.25 0.30 
𝐺_𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐  q25-q75 [-0.4;0.40] [-0.24;0.23] [-0.11;0.26] [0.00;0.27] 
Sig. 0.30 0.23 0.27 0.39 
Regressions for 𝒉 = 𝟒 
  US financial conditions indicator 
𝑦  q25-q75 [0.24;0.57] [0.32;0.55] [0.34;0.56] [0.33;0.62] 
Sig. 0.61 0.80 0.89 0.98 
𝑁𝐹𝐶𝐼  q25-q75 [-0.41;0.02] [-0.28;-0.02] [-0.22;0.00] [-0.09;0.02] 
Sig.<0 0.25 0.20 0.34 0.18 
 US financial conditions indicator + Global factors  
𝑦  q25-q75 [0.29;0.56] [0.27;0.60] [0.33;0.58] [0.34;0.60] 
Sig. 0.68 0.77 0.84 0.98 
𝑁𝐹𝐶𝐼  q25-q75 [-0.32;-0.01] [-0.31;-0.02] [-0.22;-0.02] [-0.07;0.04] 
Sig.<0 0.27 0.30 0.3 0.14 
𝐺_𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙  q25-q75 [-0.48;0.11] [-0.32;0.19] [-0.18;0.20] [-0.05;0.15] 
Sig. 0.16 0.09 0.20 0.16 
𝐺_𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐  q25-q75 [-0.49;0.05] [-0.37;0.15] [-0.23;0.16] [-0.03;0.16] 
Sig. 0.16 0.20 0.20 0.18 
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Three main messages emerge from the results in Table 1. First, the impact of the NFCI on real 
credit growth is more frequently (and significantly) negative on the lower quantiles than on the 
central quantiles of credit growth. In other words, the proportion of countries for which the 
effect is significant, is much higher in the lower quantiles. This result suggests that US financial 
fragility is an important predictor of downside risks to real credit growth in the global 
economy. Second, our results hold when we control for global financial and macroeconomic 
factors, i.e., the performance of the model including the global factors is basically 
indistinguishable from the model including only the NFCI. Third, the results also hold 
irrespective of the forecasting- horizon (h=0,1,4) but the highest percentage of countries for 
which the impact of NFCI on the quantile at 𝜏 =0.05 (0.10) of real credit growth is statistically 
significant and negative is obtained when h=4, with 27% (30%) for 44 countries. This latter 
fact suggests that the global economy requires one year to fully transmit most of the first 
moment shocks of US financial conditions to the rest of the credit markets in the world, which 
is consistent with a credit view explanation of the transmission of shocks, i.e., deterioration of 
financial conditions seem to generate a reduction of international funding sources for financing 
domestic investment which fully materializes one year after the shock. 
Interestingly, forecasting power of NFCI on the conditional distribution of credit is more 
heterogeneous than the effect of the other covariates in all our specifications. That is, financial 
conditions of the US clearly impact the negative tail of credit growth of a higher number of 
countries than in the case of the average quantiles, while the other variables, whether they are 
global common factors or idiosyncratic characteristics, exert a more homogeneous effect 
across the conditional distribution of credit.  
From Table 1 we also notice that the impact of financial conditions in the United States is very 
heterogeneous across countries. While it is a relevant predictor of negative credit dynamics at 
least four quarters ahead for around 25-30% of our sample, it is not for the rest of the 
countries. Moreover, the impact of the three global factors, namely, two global factors and the 
financial conditions index of the US, present a large variability across countries. That is, in 
most of the cases the effects contained between the first and the third quartiles of the cross-
sectional distribution of countries include both positive and negative magnitudes, meaning that 
global factors impact heterogeneously credit creation around the world.  
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Table 2 summarizes the estimation results for stock returns as the dependent variable. Again, 
for each quantile of the dependent variable (𝜏 = {0.05,0.10.0.20,0.50})  and forecasting- 
horizon (ℎ = {0,1,4}), we run two models. The first model only includes the NFCI while the 
second also considers controls for the global financial and macroeconomic factors. The table 
reports the following information: the first and last quartile of the distribution of estimated 
coefficients (q25-q75), the proportion of countries for which the variable is statistically 
significant at 90% confidence level (Sig.); for the NFCI, additionally it is shown the proportion 
of countries that is associated with negative and significant coefficients (Sig.<0).  
Results show that the highest impact of US financial conditions at the left tail of conditional 
stock returns are observed when h=0, i.e., NFCI significantly explains downside risk in stock 
markets in a contemporaneous fashion. This key result is observed even if we control for 
global financial and macroeconomic factors, as the percentage of countries for which the 
NFCI coefficient is statistically significant goes from 32% (𝜏 =0.05 quantile) to 48% (𝜏 =0.10 
quantile), out of 25 countries. Interestingly, the contemporaneous impact at the median is 
significant for a larger proportion of countries (60%) but this percentage drops to 12% when 
we control for the global factors. At horizons h=1 and h=4, the effects of NFCI on stock 
markets are less pronounced, both at the lower tail and at the central quantiles.  
An interesting pattern can be noticed as well in Table 2 that confirms the US as the likely 
origination of shocks to the global economy, which agrees with previous literature on global 
cycles, and which also validates our multinational approach. Namely, at h=1, local financial 
conditions in the United States, exert a significant impact in around 4-12% of the countries of 
our sample, for quantiles between 𝜏= 0.05 to 0.20, while the global financial factors impact the 
same quantiles for 12-16% of the countries and the global macroeconomic factors for 0-12%. 
In contrast, when h=4, the impact of the domestic financial conditions of the US only exert a 
significant influence in 4-12% of the countries, while the global financial and macroeconomic 
factors have gained in significance as to affect 40-52% and 28-64% of countries, respectively. 
This would be the case if one year after the US shock, this original shock has been fully 
transmitted to the global economy, and the non-linear amplification mechanisms operating in 
financial markets on a global scale are responsible for the newest sources of financial fragility 
to the global economy. 
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Table 2: Quantile regressions, Impact of NFCI on stock markets (EaR) 
Note: Sig. denotes proportion of countries for which the variable is statistically significant at 90% confidence 
level; q25-q75 shows the first and last quartile of the estimated coefficients. Standard errors are based on 
bootstrap with 1000 replications. 
 
 𝝉 = 
0.05 0.1 0.2 0.5 
Regressions for 𝒉 = 𝟎 
 US financial conditions indicator  
𝑁𝐹𝐶𝐼  q25-q75 [-0.65;-0.24] [-0.47;-0.2] [-0.37;-0.08] [-0.24;-0.08] 
Sig.<0 0.36 0.56 0.68 0.60 
 US financial conditions indicator + Global factors  
𝑁𝐹𝐶𝐼  q25-q75 [-0.34;0.00] [-0.24;0.02] [-0.15;-0.01] [-0.05;0.04] 
Sig.<0 0.32 0.48 0.36 0.12 
𝐺_𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙  q25-q75 [-0.79;-0.41] [-0.85;-0.42] [-0.83;-0.39] [-0.78;-0.35] 
Sig. 0.60 0.68 0.76 0.88 
𝐺_𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐  q25-q75 [-0.09;0.25] [-0.1;0.26] [-0.14;0.23] [-0.06;0.21] 
Sig. 0.20 0.08 0.40 0.24 
Regressions for 𝒉 = 𝟏 
US financial conditions indicator 
𝑦  q25-q75 [0.18;0.51] [0.19;0.47] [0.18;0.41] [0.26;0.37] 
Sig. 0.56 0.64 0.80 0.92 
𝑁𝐹𝐶𝐼  q25-q75 [-0.23;0.01] [-0.2;0.00] [-0.18;-0.02] [-0.1;0.01] 
Sig.<0 0.12 0.16 0.16 0.16 
US financial conditions indicator + Global factors 
𝑦  q25-q75 [-0.01;0.29] [0.08;0.33] [0.15;0.37] [0.16;0.38] 
Sig. 0.08 0.32 0.48 0.56 
𝑁𝐹𝐶𝐼  q25-q75 [-0.21;0.05] [-0.18;0.01] [-0.15;0.00] [-0.07;0.01] 
Sig.<0 0.12 0.04 0.08 0.16 
𝐺_𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙  q25-q75 [-0.35;0.09] [-0.53;-0.07] [-0.41;-0.09] [-0.24;-0.01] 
Sig. 0.12 0.12 0.16 0.00 
𝐺_𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝒕 q25-q75 [-0.20;0.40] [-0.31;0.03] [-0.26;-0.09] [-0.18;-0.03] 
Sig. 0.08 0.00 0.12 0.00 
Regressions for 𝒉 = 𝟒 
US financial conditions indicator 
𝑦  q25-q75 [-0.10;0.29] [0.00;0.17] [-0.02;0.10] [-0.09;0.03] 
Sig. 0.20 0.16 0.08 0.08 
𝑁𝐹𝐶𝐼  q25-q75 [-0.28;0.14] [-0.14;0.09] [-0.09;0.06] [-0.06;0.04] 
Sig.<0 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.12 
US financial conditions indicator + Global factors 
𝑦  q25-q75 [-0.07;0.16] [-0.13;0.17] [-0.11;0.12] [-0.10;0.04] 
Sig. 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.08 
𝑁𝐹𝐶𝐼  q25-q75 [-0.18;0.21] [-0.17;0.13] [-0.08;0.09] [-0.07;0.06] 
Sig.<0 0.04 0.12 0.04 0.08 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙  q25-q75 [-0.96;-0.33] [-0.79;-0.46] [-0.64;-0.34] [-0.36;-0.08] 
Sig. 0.40 0.52 0.52 0.36 
𝐺_𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝒕 q25-q75 [-0.82;-0.36] [-0.88;-0.36] [-0.62;-0.40] [-0.38;-0.11] 
Sig. 0.28 0.56 0.64 0.52 
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Once again, the effects across countries at the lowest quantiles of the stock market growth are 
heterogeneous. That is, the interquartile range of the cross-sectional distribution of countries 
includes both positive and negative values, not only for the financial condition index, but also 
in the case of macroeconomic and financial global factors, pointing out to a heterogeneous 
risk-sharing picture across countries. While an important fraction of the countries react 
negatively to a deterioration of either the financial conditions in the US or the two global 
factors, most of them do not react or even react positively to the shock.  
One way in which the transmission of shocks may occur across countries is through spillovers 
effects of the “prudent risk-taking” or “productive risk-taking” channel of monetary policy. 
This is a channel that leads to increased risk-taking by banks in response to monetary policy 
easing, which is consistent with traditional portfolio allocation models. Namely, lower policy 
rates make riskier investments more attractive. 
Importantly, the largest effects of US financial fragility on credit markets are observed one year 
after the realization of the shock, suggesting that US financial conditions can be used as a 
predictor of the future vulnerability of domestic credit conditions by regulators and central 
banks around the globe. On the contrary, the effects on stock markets are mainly 
contemporaneous, which prevents the use of this indicator to forecast future prices or as an 
early warning indicator that alerts on future limitation of internal (equity) funding.  
5.2. Impact of US financial uncertainty shocks on global markets  
5.2.1. Global credit markets 
Similar to Table 1, Table 3 summarizes the estimation results for credit growth as the 
dependent variable but this time bringing to play the US financial uncertainty index instead of 






Table 3: Quantile regressions, Impact of Financial Uncertainty on real credit growth 
Note: Sig. denotes proportion of countries for which the variable is statistically significant at 90% confidence 
level; q25-q75 shows the first and last quartile of the estimated coefficients. Intercepts are omitted. Standard 
errors are based on bootstrap with 1000 replications. Sample: 1971Q1 to 2019Q4 for 44 countries, except for 
Bolivia (to 2019Q3), Iceland (to 2018Q4) and Taiwan (to 2018Q4). 
 
 𝝉 = 
0.05 0.1 0.2 0.5 
Regressions for 𝒉 = 𝟎 
 US financial uncertainty indicator 
𝐹_𝑈𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦  q25-q75 [-0.23;0.05] [-0.2;0.02] [-0.13;0.02] [-0.07;0.02] 
Sig.<0 0.14 0.20 0.25 0.23 
US financial uncertainty indicator + Global factors 
𝐹_𝑈𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦  q25-q75 [-0.29;0.02] [-0.21;-0.02] [-0.15;0.00] [-0.1;0.05] 
Sig.<0 0.16 0.25 0.25 0.20 
𝐺_𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙  q25-q75 [-0.15;0.57] [0.07;0.54] [0.05;0.61] [0.17;0.64] 
Sig. 0.36 0.48 0.57 0.68 
𝐺_𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐  q25-q75 [-0.13;0.48] [-0.09;0.52] [0.00;0.62] [0.10;0.67] 
Sig. 0.32 0.50 0.55 0.64 
Regressions for 𝒉 = 𝟏 
US financial uncertainty indicator 
𝑦  q25-q75 [0.00;0.25] [-0.03;0.28] [0.09;0.30] [0.13;0.41] 
Sig. 0.30 0.39 0.64 0.73 
𝐹_𝑈𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦  q25-q75 [-0.22;0.04] [-0.17;0.01] [-0.1;0.00] [-0.09;-0.02] 
Sig.<0 0.18 0.20 0.23 0.25 
  US financial uncertainty indicator + Global factors  
𝑦  q25-q75 [-0.09;0.25] [-0.01;0.26] [0.05;0.27] [0.09;0.36] 
Sig. 0.30 0.43 0.57 0.73 
𝐹_𝑈𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦  q25-q75 [-0.22;0.06] [-0.14;0.04] [-0.12;0.00] [-0.07;0.03] 
Sig.<0 0.16 0.18 0.23 0.14 
𝐺_𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙  q25-q75 [-0.31;0.21] [-0.33;0.16] [-0.14;0.23] [0.01;0.29] 
Sig. 0.27 0.25 0.34 0.30 
𝐺_𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐  q25-q75 [-0.21;0.28] [-0.23;0.25] [-0.18;0.27] [0.07;0.31] 
Sig. 0.25 0.27 0.39 0.34 
Regressions for 𝒉 = 𝟒 
   US financial uncertainty indicator 
𝑦  q25-q75 [0.22;0.57] [0.24;0.55] [0.29;0.57] [0.34;0.61] 
Sig. 0.61 0.70 0.89 0.98 
𝐹_𝑈𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦  q25-q75 [-0.23;0.03] [-0.17;0.01] [-0.11;-0.01] [-0.1;0] 
Sig.<0 0.18 0.23 0.18 0.23 
  US financial uncertainty indicator + Global factors  
𝑦  q25-q75 [0.21;0.56] [0.26;0.56] [0.31;0.57] [0.33;0.58] 
Sig. 0.59 0.75 0.89 0.98 
𝐹_𝑈𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦  q25-q75 [-0.24;-0.02] [-0.20;0.01] [-0.13;-0.03] [-0.09;0.01] 
Sig.<0 0.18 0.23 0.20 0.18 
𝐺_𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙  q25-q75 [-0.38;0.20] [-0.26;0.25] [-0.15;0.19] [0.02;0.18] 
Sig. 0.27 0.20 0.27 0.23 
𝐺_𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐  q25-q75 [-0.44;0.12] [-0.30;0.18] [-0.19;0.14] [0.02;0.21] 
Sig. 0.32 0.30 0.18 0.25 
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We observe that the impact of financial uncertainty on the lower quantiles of real credit growth 
is negative and higher in absolute value than on the central quantiles, although the proportion 
of countries for which the effect is significant, is similar across quantiles. These results hold 
when we control for global financial and macroeconomic factors. This time, the highest effects 
of financial uncertainty are recorded well in advance of h=4. Indeed, the impact is quite similar 
across all forecasting- horizons (h={0,1,4}). Importantly, on h=4, first moment financial 
shocks on credit growth (Table 1) exert an economically and statistically significant effect for a 
greater number of countries compared to other horizons. This is in accordance with first 
moment shocks associated with credit tightness and which consistently take more time to 
spillover to global markets, therefore supporting the credit view of the spread. 
As with NFCI, we notice that the impact of financial uncertainty in the US is very 
heterogeneous across countries. Not only because it is a relevant predictor of negative credit 
dynamics for around 16-25% of our sample of countries while it is not for the rest of the 
economies, but also because these effects can be positive or negative.  If we focus on the 
global factors, we observe that global factors impact heterogeneously credit creation around 
the world. In general, these covariates impact the average quantiles of credit growth of a higher 
number of countries than in the case of the negative tail. Additionally, the effects of these 
global factors include a wide range of values, often showing high positive values even on the 
lowest quantiles.  
Similar to Table 2, Table 4 summarizes the estimation results for stock returns as the 
dependent variable but using the US financial uncertainty index instead of the NFCI as our 









Table 4: Quantile regressions, Impact of Financial Uncertainty on stock markets 
Note: Sig. denotes proportion of countries for which the variable is statistically significant at 90% confidence 
level; q25-q75 shows the first and last quartile of the estimated coefficients. Standard errors are based on 
bootstrap with 1000 replications. 
 𝝉 = 
0.05 0.1 0.2 0.5 
Regressions for 𝒉 = 𝟎 
  US financial uncertainty indicator 
𝐹_𝑈𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦  q25-q75 [-0.64;-0.36] [-0.57;-0.30] [-0.44;-0.23] [-0.27;-0.16] 
Sig.<0 0.88 0.88 0.92 0.88 
  US financial uncertainty indicator + Global factors  
𝐹_𝑈𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦  q25-q75 [-0.31;-0.04] [-0.22;-0.02] [-0.13;-0.03] [-0.05;0.01] 
Sig.<0 0.48 0.48 0.32 0.12 
𝐺_𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙  q25-q75 [-0.89;-0.17] [-0.84;-0.29] [-0.80;-0.38] [-0.66;-0.32] 
Sig. 0.56 0.68 0.88 0.88 
𝐺_𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐  q25-q75 [-0.21;0.36] [-0.15;0.24] [-0.16;0.17] [0.00;0.23] 
Sig. 0.28 0.28 0.36 0.4 
Regressions for 𝒉 = 𝟏 
US financial uncertainty indicator 
𝑦  q25-q75 [0.09;0.45] [0.11;0.37] [0.18;0.33] [0.23;0.34] 
Sig. 0.52 0.56 0.72 0.96 
𝐹_𝑈𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦  q25-q75 [-0.58;-0.33] [-0.42;-0.26] [-0.25;-0.12] [-0.13;-0.02] 
Sig.<0 0.88 0.76 0.56 0.24 
US financial uncertainty indicator + Global factors 
𝑦  q25-q75 [-0.02;0.36] [-0.04;0.38] [0.11;0.33] [0.21;0.39] 
Sig. 0.32 0.32 0.60 0.72 
𝐹_𝑈𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦  q25-q75 [-0.64;-0.26] [-0.46;-0.21] [-0.27;-0.12] [-0.11;-0.03] 
Sig.<0 0.6 0.76 0.6 0.24 
𝐺_𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙  q25-q75 [-0.27;0.28] [-0.27;0.18] [-0.24;0.02] [-0.24;-0.02] 
Sig. 0.20 0.20 0.16 0.12 
𝐺_𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝒕 q25-q75 [-0.19;0.37] [-0.18;0.13] [-0.25;0.04] [-0.18;-0.08] 
Sig. 0.20 0.04 0.08 0.16 
Regressions for 𝒉 = 𝟒 
US financial uncertainty indicator 
𝑦  q25-q75 [-0.16;0.21] [-0.05;0.12] [-0.03;0.05] [-0.07;0.06] 
Sig. 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.12 
𝐹_𝑈𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦  q25-q75 [-0.29;-0.09] [-0.22;-0.08] [-0.13;0] [-0.04;0.04] 
Sig.<0 0.12 0.08 0.16 0.04 
US financial uncertainty indicator + Global factors 
𝑦  q25-q75 [-0.18;0.16] [-0.15;0.15] [-0.11;0.06] [-0.12;0.09] 
Sig. 0.04 0.12 0.08 0.16 
𝐹_𝑈𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦  q25-q75 [-0.27;-0.07] [-0.19;-0.04] [-0.11;-0.04] [-0.08;0.00] 
Sig.<0 0.08 0.12 0.12 0.04 
𝐺_𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙  q25-q75 [-0.48;-0.02] [-0.50;-0.11] [-0.42;-0.17] [-0.40;-0.11] 
Sig. 0.12 0.16 0.52 0.64 
𝐺_𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝒕 q25-q75 [-0.56;-0.09] [-0.55;-0.08] [-0.49;-0.22] [-0.37;-0.25] 
Sig. 0.20 0.36 0.60 0.72 
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Results show that at horizons h=0 and h=1, the impact of financial uncertainty at the lower 
tail of the distribution of conditional stock returns is very high. At horizon h=4, the effects of 
financial uncertainty are much less pronounced.  This key result is observed even if we control 
for global financial and macroeconomic factors, as the percentage of countries for which the 
financial uncertainty coefficient is statistically significant goes from 60% (𝜏 =0.05 quantile) to 
76% (𝜏 =0.10 quantile), out of 25 countries. This fast and strong response of global stock 
markets to US financial uncertainty is consistent with portfolio rebalancing by international 
investors following an increase of US financial uncertainty, and thus, with the portfolio view of 
the transmission. 
As with NFCI, we observe that financial uncertainty impacts more frequently and significantly 
the lower quantiles of stock markets than the average quantiles while the impact of global 
common factors (financial and macroeconomic) is higher on the average quantiles. 
Interestingly, we observe a less heterogeneous response across countries than in the case of 
NFCI. That is, financial uncertainty is a relevant predictor of stock price declines for a larger 
percentage of countries than NFCI, and, in addition (in all cases), the effect documented for 
the lowest quartiles (𝜏 =0.05 and 𝜏 =0.1) is negative.  
Overall, our results confirm that both, first and second moment shocks to US financial 
conditions convey powerful signals on downside risks to funding markets. They suggest that, 
analogous to vulnerable growth episodes documented in the previous literature, there exist also 
vulnerable funding periods of a global scale, originating from financial fragility in the US. These 
results highlight the importance of funding for the transmission of recessionary shocks. In 
addition, our results emphasize the role of the portfolio view for the propagation of financial 
uncertainty (largely through the stock market), and of the credit view to understand the 
propagation of first moment financial conditions shocks (largely through the credit market). 
Both mechanisms are complementary and help to better understand the propagation of US 




5.3. Cross-country heterogeneity  
5.3.1. Graphical analysis 
To examine which is the most likely reason for a given country vulnerability to changes in the 
financial conditions of the US, first, we relate the size of each country credit and stock 
market’s responses to two classical determinants of the international spreading of financial 
shock, namely, the size of credit (stock) markets, and the relative importance of US foreign 
investment for each country. We measure the size of credit markets by the annual average of 
the credit to GDP ratio for each country, the size of stock markets by the annual average of 
the market capitalization to GDP ratio and, financial interconnection by the total direct 
investment of the US as a percentage of the country’s GDP. To this end, we compute for each 
country the maximum value of US investment inflows relative to its GDP12.  
In both cases, credit and stock markets, we show the results for the horizon and the ordering 
measure that provides the clearest pattern. This translates into showing the results for horizon 
h=0 and sorting the countries by the size or depth of the market in the case of credit markets 
and by its financial closeness to the US in the case of stock markets13.   
Figure 2 shows the impact of NFCI over the entire distribution of credit growth of the 
countries in the sample (for forecasting- horizon h=0), ordered according to their credit to 
GDP ratio. Interestingly, we find that there is a cluster in the lower left-hand corner of the 
heat map, suggesting that the economies with lower credit to GDP ratios are more sensitive to 
a first moment shock to US financial conditions and that the response is stronger in the left tail 
(lower quantiles) of the distribution. However, the response of economies with higher credit to 
GDP ratios is much weaker, or inexistent. This is, the smaller the credit market, the most likely 
that country will experience vulnerable funding episodes. In turn, credit market size is 
associated with market development, which suggest an asymmetric impact of financial 
conditions first moment shocks on emerging and advanced economies This result suggest that 
when we focus on shocks to the first moment of the financial conditions, vulnerable funding is 
clearly associated with the size or depth of a country’s credit market and it is consistent with 
the view advanced for instance by Alfaro et al. (2004) and Kalemli-Özcan (2019).  
 
                                                        
12 Results are robust when we use the average instead of the maximum value. 
13 Results for horizons h=1 and h=4 are available upon request. 
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Figure 2. Impact of NFCI over the distribution of future credit growth 
 
Note: The left-hand panel shows the NFCI coefficients for 𝜏 = 0.05 − 0.95 in 0.05  intervals, for all 44 
countries. The right-hand panel presents the statistically significance of the NFCI coefficients as well as the sign 
of the estimated coefficient. The blue (grey)-shaded areas are defined as being negative (positive) statistically 
significant at the 90% level of confidence, whereas the white-shaded area corresponds to insignificant coefficients 
associated with the NFCI. 
 
Figure 3 shows the impact of NFCI over the entire distribution of stock returns (for 
forecasting- horizon h=0) of the countries in the sample ordered by their degree of financial 
interconnection with the US. We find a cluster in the upper left-hand corner of the heat maps, 
suggesting that the sensitivity of the effect of NFCI on the lower part of the distribution of 
stock returns is related to the relative importance of US investment for a given country. This 
fact, ultimately suggests that stock markets of economies that share stronger financial links 
with the US are more severely affected by a tightening in US financial conditions than 




Figure 3. Impact of NFCI over the distribution of current stock returns 
 
Note: The left-hand panel shows the NFCI coefficients for 𝜏 = 0.05 − 0.95 in 0.05  intervals, for all 25 
countries. The right-hand panel presents the statistically significance of the NFCI coefficients as well as the sign 
of the estimated coefficient. The blue (grey)-shaded areas are defined as being negative (positive) statistically 
significant at the 90% level of confidence, whereas the white-shaded area corresponds to insignificant coefficients 
associated with the NFCI. 
 
Interestingly, most of the countries showing larger stock market responses to first moment 
shocks in US financial conditions are developed markets. It seems that the relative importance 
of USD foreign flows to a country does determine to a great extent how domestic share value 
will react following a deterioration of US financial conditions, and indeed in general, to global 
financial factors. While FDI flows are more volatile for emerging countries as the past 
literature have documented, the stock markets of advanced economies, such as Ireland, 
Switzerland, the Netherlands, Canada and the United Kingdom (which are the five top main 
receptors of US foreign direct investment), are also among the most affected countries in our 
sample, after a deterioration of the financial conditions in the US. This can be observed 
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looking at the significance of the estimated effects for the five countries (right-hand side plot), 
and the darker color in the heat map associated to the quantile slope that measures the effect 
of NFCI in each market (left hand side plot) of Figure 3. Thus, the depth and liquidity of the 
local stock market may prevent the impact of the external shock on the real economy to be 
dramatic, but in any case, the local funding opportunities reduce following a deterioration of 
US financial conditions, as expected. These results point out to the vulnerability of local 
financial markets to external imbalances and credit restrictions, given the high degree of 
interconnectedness of current global finance.  
Figure 4 shows the impact of US financial uncertainty over the entire distribution of credit 
growth (for forecasting- horizon h=0) of the countries in the sample, ordered according to size 
or depth of the market. As with first moment shocks to US financial conditions, we observe 
that the size or depth of the credit markets is important to explain credit vulnerability to 
financial uncertainty and that most of the countries showing higher responses are emerging 
market economies. Again, the smaller the credit market size, the most likely a country will 
experience vulnerable funding episodes. This result is consistent with Carrière-Swallow and 
Céspedes (2003) who find that in comparison to the U.S. and other developed countries, 
emerging economies suffer much more severe falls in investment and private consumption 
following an exogenous uncertainty shock. Bhattarai et al (2020) also document that 
unanticipated changes in US uncertainty have significant effects on emerging market 
economies. 
We also find that, although in general the effect is more negative in the lower quantiles than on 
the central ones, the proportion of countries for which the effect is significant, is relatively 








Figure 4. Impact of Financial Uncertainty index over the distribution of future credit 
growth 
 
Note: The left-hand panel shows the financial uncertainty coefficients for 𝜏 = 0.05 − 0.95 in 0.05 intervals, for 
all 44 countries. The right-hand panel presents the statistically significance of the financial uncertainty coefficients 
as well as the sign of the estimated coefficient. The blue (grey)-shaded areas are defined as being negative 
(positive) statistically significant at the 90% level of confidence, whereas the white-shaded area corresponds to 
insignificant coefficients associated with the financial uncertainty index. 
 
Finally, Figure 5 shows the impact of US financial uncertainty over the entire distribution of 
stock return (for forecasting- horizon h=0) of the countries in the sample, ordered according 
to the strength of their financial links with the US. Now, we observe graphically that the 
impact of financial uncertainty at the left tail of the conditional distribution of stock returns is 
very large for a high percentage of countries. As with first moment shocks, we find a cluster in 
the upper left-hand corner of the heat map, suggesting that the sensitivity of the effect of 
financial uncertainty on the lower part of the distribution of stock returns is related to the 
degree of US investment abroad. Again, the stock markets of advanced economies are among 
the most affected countries in our sample, after a shock to financial uncertainty in the US. 
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Figure 5. Impact of Financial Uncertainty index over the distribution of current stock returns 
 
Note: The left-hand panel shows the financial uncertainty coefficients for 𝜏 = 0.05 − 0.95 in 0.05 intervals, for 
all 25 countries. The right-hand panel presents the statistically significance of the financial uncertainty coefficients 
as well as the sign of the estimated coefficient. The blue (grey)-shaded areas are defined as being negative 
(positive) statistically significant at the 90% level of confidence, whereas the white-shaded area corresponds to 
insignificant coefficients associated with the financial uncertainty index. 
 
Overall, we find that the heterogeneous dynamic of Credit at Risk episodes is better explained 
by the size or depth of the credit market while, in the case of Equity at Risk episodes, 
heterogeneity is more related to the financial interconnections with the US. This result holds 
for both, first moment shocks and financial uncertainty shocks.  
5.3.2. Cross-sectional analysis 
 
In this subsection we present the results of our exploratory regressions that measure the 
association between financial vulnerability and the two classical determinants of the 
international spreading of financial shocks. We used as our right-hand-side variable the slope 
coefficients of CaR or EaR at various quantiles, and as left-hand-side variables both, the ratio 
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of US direct investment to the GDP of each country and the ratio of credit (market 
capitalization) to GDP of each country. We estimate these latter variables using the average of 
the yearly indicators across the sample period (1960 Q1- 2019 Q4) and using the annual 
maximum across the sample (as to emphasize the most extreme scenarios). Table 5 to 7 
present the results using the maxima version, which are virtually the same than using the 
averages (which are available upon request).  Table 5 and 6 focus on the credit market and 
Table 7 and 8 on the stock market. 
 
Table 5:  Cross-sectional determinants of vulnerable credit (first moment shock) 
 𝝉 = 
 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.8 0.9 0.95 
Regressions for 𝒉 = 𝟎 
US inv./GDP (%) 0.000200 -0.000584 -0.000856 -0.00101 -0.00118* -0.000904 0.000164 
 (0.00104) (0.000800) (0.000615) (0.000776) (0.000675) (0.000715) (0.000798) 
        
Credit/GDP (%) 0.00249** 0.00175** 0.00144** 0.00138*** 0.00124* 0.00120* 0.00172* 
 (0.00109) (0.000777) (0.000584) (0.000445) (0.000656) (0.000679) (0.000911) 
        
Constant -0.317*** -0.213*** -0.158*** -0.0596* 0.0301 0.0330 -0.0210 
 (0.0813) (0.0615) (0.0472) (0.0297) (0.0412) (0.0493) (0.0665) 
Regressions for 𝒉 = 𝟏 
US inv./GDP (%) -0.000358 -0.000884 -0.00125 -0.000886*** -0.000679* -0.000343 -0.000486 
 (0.000936) (0.00112) (0.00108) (0.000267) (0.000361) (0.000879) (0.000866) 
        
Credit/GDP (%) 0.00193* 0.00111 0.000585 0.000496 0.000961** 0.000534 0.00121 
 (0.00102) (0.000662) (0.000462) (0.000468) (0.000431) (0.000541) (0.000939) 
        
Constant -0.280*** -0.196*** -0.126*** -0.0183 0.0192 0.0907** 0.0722 
 (0.0813) (0.0527) (0.0304) (0.0260) (0.0287) (0.0382) (0.0625) 
Regressions for 𝒉 = 𝟒 
US inv./GDP (%) -0.00284 -0.00236 -0.00161* -0.00198*** -0.000739 -0.00132 -0.00135 
 (0.00218) (0.00149) (0.000853) (0.000429) (0.000771) (0.00145) (0.00108) 
        
Credit/GDP (%) 0.00244** 0.000960 -0.000108 0.000800** 0.000561 -0.000139 -0.000281 
 (0.00114) (0.000755) (0.000443) (0.000309) (0.000465) (0.000621) (0.00100) 
        
Constant -0.303*** -0.201*** -0.0792** -0.0429* 0.0420 0.142*** 0.160** 
 (0.0935) (0.0661) (0.0376) (0.0239) (0.0281) (0.0444) (0.0630) 
N 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 
Robust standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
From a general reading of Table 5 when h=0, we have that market size significantly explains 
the transmission of NFCI shocks. The effect is the one expected from the theory and in 
accordance to previous studies, namely, the larger the market the lower the negative effect of 
US financial conditions on that market. When h=1, 4 market size loses its significance in most 
of the cases as it only remains significant at the lowest quantiles (0.05) and the median of the 
distribution. On its side, financial closeness to the US helps to explain the central quantiles 
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when h=1 (𝝉 = 0.8) and h=4 (𝝉 = 0.5) but not the vulnerable funding episodes associated with 
the lowest quantiles. The same narrative suits Table 6, namely market size helps to explain the 
propagation of financial uncertainty across the world credit markets, when h=0, while at other 
horizons and especially for the lowest quantiles the explanation escapes from these two 
traditional determinants. 
 
Table 6:  Cross-sectional determinants of vulnerable credit (second moment shock) 
 𝝉 = 
 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.8 0.9 0.95 
Regressions for 𝒉 = 𝟎 
US inv./GDP (%) -0.000269 -0.000502 -0.000436 0.000299 0.000801* 0.000584* 0.00170*** 
 (0.000905) (0.00123) (0.000972) (0.000582) (0.000430) (0.000324) (0.000410) 
        
Credit/GDP (%) 0.00138 0.00146** 0.000987** 0.000936* 0.00140** 0.00178** 0.00242** 
 (0.000837) (0.000549) (0.000487) (0.000536) (0.000642) (0.000797) (0.000962) 
        
Constant -0.206*** -0.193*** -0.124*** -0.0844** -0.104** -0.118** -0.177*** 
 (0.0601) (0.0390) (0.0362) (0.0341) (0.0423) (0.0524) (0.0643) 
Regressions for 𝒉 = 𝟏 
US inv./GDP (%) -0.00177 -0.000651 -0.000769 0.0000613 0.000471* 0.000766** 0.000461 
 (0.00183) (0.000984) (0.000751) (0.000478) (0.000267) (0.000347) (0.00139) 
        
Credit/GDP (%) -0.000280 0.000302 0.000504 0.000586 0.000659 0.00110 0.00250* 
 (0.000923) (0.000491) (0.000419) (0.000401) (0.000538) (0.000714) (0.00127) 
        
Constant -0.0672 -0.0713* -0.0756** -0.0572* -0.0366 -0.0585 -0.148** 
 (0.0841) (0.0398) (0.0353) (0.0293) (0.0341) (0.0487) (0.0724) 
Regressions for 𝒉 = 𝟒 
US inv./GDP (%) -0.000462 -0.00135 -0.00109** -0.00110*** 0.000539* 0.000190 0.000662 
 (0.00141) (0.000864) (0.000507) (0.000380) (0.000294) (0.000447) (0.000554) 
        
Credit/GDP (%) 0.00103 -0.000441 -0.000644** 0.000369 0.000225 0.000322 0.0000929 
 (0.000758) (0.000510) (0.000258) (0.000285) (0.000615) (0.000780) (0.00118) 
        
Constant -0.192*** -0.0627* -0.0249 -0.0482** -0.00561 0.0371 0.0458 
 (0.0501) (0.0353) (0.0186) (0.0180) (0.0342) (0.0466) (0.0801) 
N 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 
Robust standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
When we turn our attention to the stock markets, a different landscape emerges. In Table 7 we 
can observe that when h=0 the relative size of US investment (market closeness to the US) 
significantly explains the transmission of NFCI shocks. The effect is the one expected from 
the theory: the closest markets to the US (i.e. larger relative reception of US annual investment 
as a percentage of local GDP) are the most affected (independently on the size of the market), 
which can be rationalized with the portfolio view operating on the global transmission of US 
financial conditions. This time the size of the market does not offer explanatory power for the 
vulnerable funding episodes (or even for the transmission on the highest quantiles).  
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Table 7:  Cross-sectional determinants of vulnerable equity (first moment shock) 
 
 𝝉 = 
 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.8 0.9 0.95 
Regressions for 𝒉 = 𝟎 
US inv./GDP (%) -0.00206** -0.00172*** -0.000933** -0.00102*** -0.00154*** -0.00205*** -0.00208* 
 (0.000889) (0.000542) (0.000361) (0.000255) (0.000337) (0.000592) (0.00107) 
        
Market Cap./GDP 
(%) 
-0.00124 -0.00129* -0.000317 -0.000117 0.000412 0.000103 0.000128 
 (0.00106) (0.000713) (0.000415) (0.000366) (0.000887) (0.000773) (0.00121) 
        
Constant -0.00952 -0.0128 -0.0351 0.0324 0.117* 0.217*** 0.216** 
 (0.0766) (0.0554) (0.0395) (0.0360) (0.0647) (0.0650) (0.0906) 
Regressions for 𝒉 = 𝟏 
US inv./GDP (%) -0.000509 -0.0000444 -0.000627** -0.000906*** -0.000740** -0.0000370 0.000994 
 (0.000816) (0.000462) (0.000225) (0.000246) (0.000342) (0.000395) (0.00106) 
        
Market Cap./GDP 
(%) 
-0.00144 -0.000531 -0.000890** -0.0000682 0.00182* 0.00275*** 0.00237*** 
 (0.00119) (0.000933) (0.000424) (0.000437) (0.000888) (0.000791) (0.000772) 
        
Constant -0.0116 -0.0382 -0.00695 -0.00529 -0.0441 -0.0617 -0.0108 
 (0.1000) (0.0714) (0.0371) (0.0354) (0.0579) (0.0676) (0.0705) 
Regressions for 𝒉 = 𝟒 
US inv./GDP (%) -0.000400 -0.000130 -0.00130*** -0.000229 -0.000937** -0.0000656 -0.000329 
 (0.00177) (0.000544) (0.000434) (0.000495) (0.000375) (0.000623) (0.000711) 
        
Market Cap./GDP 
(%) 
-0.00199 -0.00240** -0.00145** -0.000563 0.0000627 0.00117 0.000862 
 (0.00127) (0.000895) (0.000611) (0.000483) (0.000817) (0.00118) (0.00114) 
        
Constant 0.178 0.167* 0.122** 0.0469 0.0791 0.0915 0.205** 
 (0.109) (0.0869) (0.0533) (0.0516) (0.0725) (0.0748) (0.0850) 
N 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Robust standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
When we move from h=0 to h=1, 4, financial closeness keeps its explanatory power for the 
central quantiles but not for the lowest. Moreover, for the central cases the market size gains 
some statistical power, which nevertheless is accompanied by a negative sign, meaning that 
advanced economies are more susceptible to receive shocks from the US than emerging 
economies.  A very similar panorama arises when we move to the last table of our estimations 
(Table 8). This table focuses on the second moment shocks (financial uncertainty) effect on 
the stock markets. Again it is financial closeness instead of market size which offers significant 
explanatory power of vulnerable funding episodes. The size of the stock market only matters 
four quarters after the shock has occurred.  
All in all, our cross-sectional regressions tell us that market size and financial closeness to the 
US explain vulnerable funding episodes, at least contemporaneously. Nevertheless, the 
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explanation depends on the market. Credit markets react according to market size, while stock 
markets to financial closeness. There are not notable differences in this case between the 
explanatory power of first and second moment shocks of these two variables.  
 
Table 8:  Cross-sectional determinants of vulnerable equity (second moment shock) 
 𝝉 = 
 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.8 0.9 0.95 
Regressions for 𝒉 = 𝟎 
US inv./GDP (%) -0.00109** -0.00124*** -0.000714*** -0.000578*** -0.00108*** -0.00147*** -0.00102** 
 (0.000431) (0.000277) (0.000191) (0.000140) (0.000294) (0.000414) (0.000486) 
        
Market Cap./GDP (%) -0.00103 -0.000489 -0.000257 0.0000940 0.000817** 0.000897 -0.000184 
 (0.000684) (0.000605) (0.000444) (0.000326) (0.000373) (0.000591) (0.00102) 
        
Constant -0.107 -0.0684 -0.0467 -0.00853 0.0265 0.105* 0.201* 
 (0.0678) (0.0489) (0.0331) (0.0223) (0.0326) (0.0547) (0.104) 
Regressions for 𝒉 = 𝟏 
US inv./GDP (%) -0.00316** -0.00142*** -0.000857* -0.000213 -0.000283 0.000396 0.0000253 
 (0.00130) (0.000404) (0.000437) (0.000176) (0.000185) (0.000346) (0.000389) 
        
Market Cap./GDP (%) -0.00195* -0.000895 -0.000746* -0.000278 0.000753* 0.00162*** 0.00126 
 (0.00100) (0.000730) (0.000389) (0.000397) (0.000379) (0.000528) (0.000753) 
        
Constant -0.271*** -0.248*** -0.124*** -0.0477* -0.0195 -0.0333 0.0816 
 (0.0795) (0.0590) (0.0367) (0.0264) (0.0285) (0.0360) (0.0595) 
Regressions for 𝒉 = 𝟒 
US inv./GDP (%) 0.000271 0.000310 -0.000418* -0.000448 -0.000262 -0.000353 0.000387 
 (0.000509) (0.000283) (0.000202) (0.000327) (0.000412) (0.000330) (0.000549) 
        
Market Cap./GDP (%) -0.00212*** -0.00166** -0.000471 -0.000232 0.000436 0.00112 0.00136 
 (0.000677) (0.000681) (0.000495) (0.000299) (0.000448) (0.000904) (0.00114) 
        
Constant -0.0346 -0.0297 -0.0368 -0.00249 0.00279 0.00531 0.0163 
 (0.0715) (0.0456) (0.0339) (0.0253) (0.0334) (0.0565) (0.0632) 
N 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Robust standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
6. Conclusions 
We systematically document vulnerable funding episodes in the world economy. That is, 
financial conditions in the United States have significant predictive power on the lowest 
quantiles of credit growth and stock market prices around the global economy. However, the 
established effects are very heterogeneous in several dimensions. Vulnerable funding depends 
on the country, the funding market, i.e., credit or stock, and the type of shock, i.e., mean-shock 
to financial conditions or second-moment uncertainty shock. We also show that vulnerable 
funding can be explained, mainly contemporaneously, by the relative market size in the case of 
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credit markets and by the financial links with the US (measured by the total direct investment 
of the US as a percentage of the country’s GDP) in the case of the stock market.  
Our methodological approach uses quantile regressions, following the emphasis of the Growth 
at Risk literature, which allows us to examine the impact of financial conditions in the US in 
the whole conditional distributions of credit and stock market prices around the world, and 
hence to document the asymmetric impacts summarized before. We complement our model 
specification with global economic and financial factors, that we construct using a rich data set 
that comprises more than 40 countries, most of the time with information spanning almost six 
decades. Our results are robust to include both, a global macroeconomic factor and a global 
financial factor.  
The impact of financial conditions of the United States on global stock markets is immediate, 
so that the strongest effects are observed in the same period of the realization of the shock. 
Reducing the possibility of using the indicator of financial conditions of the US as a measure 
of future market performance, or as an early warning indicator foreseeing future limited 
funding by corporations. The opposite occurs in the case of credit markets, the larger effects 
are observed according to our specification, one year after the origination of the shock, which 
means that financial conditions in the US may serve as a predicting variable of future 
vulnerability of domestic credit markets. These two effects put together emphasize on the 
importance of funding for the transmission of recessionary shocks throughout the global 
economy, and on the necessity of monitoring funding variables and their relationship with 
global financial shocks in financial stability exercises conducted by central banks and regulators 
around the world, on a regular basis. 
The policy implications of our results are clear. We show that international funding markets 
are a source of persistence and amplification of financial conditions shocks across the global 
economy. This means that a deterioration of financial conditions in the US calls for policy 
actions in other economies around the world. For instance, an increase in market uncertainty 
that is associated with lower global liquidity and credit availability might amplify the fall in 
investment (and slows down economic recovery) observed after an international shock to US 
financial conditions. Under such scenarios it may be determinant on the side of domestic fiscal 
and monetary authorities, to foster internal demand, by reducing the cost of financing and 
providing liquidity to companies that look to invest once uncertainty has returned to its normal 
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levels. We show that this line of reasoning is more general than the previous literature has 
indicated, because the deterioration of funding opportunities either via credit or the stock 
market is observed in all types of economies, regardless of the side of their financial markets. 
Indeed such differentiation does not matter at all for stock markets, and although it is 
important for credit markets, in the sense that larger markets are less prone to vulnerable 
funding episodes than smaller markets, vulnerable funding continues to be a concern for 
developed economies as well, according to our estimation results.  
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Table A1: Availability of information for each country and variable in Monnet and Puy 
(2019) macro-financial dataset. 
Country Variable Start End T 
Argentina CPI 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Argentina Real credit 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Argentina Real GDP 1957 Q1 2019 Q4 252 
Australia CPI 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Australia Real credit 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Australia Real GDP 1957 Q1 2019 Q4 252 
Australia Nominal stock prices 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Australia Bond Yield 1955 Q1 2019 Q4 260 
Austria CPI 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Austria Real credit 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Austria Real GDP 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Austria Nominal stock prices 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Belgium CPI 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Belgium Real credit 1950 Q4 2019 Q4 277 
Belgium Real GDP 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Belgium Nominal stock prices 1951 Q1 2019 Q4 276 
Belgium Bond Yield 1957 Q1 2017 Q4 244 
Bolivia CPI 1950 Q4 2019 Q4 277 
Bolivia Real credit 1950 Q4 2019 Q3 276 
Brazil CPI 1950 Q4 2019 Q4 277 
Brazil Real credit 1950 Q4 2019 Q4 277 
Brazil Real GDP 1957 Q1 2019 Q4 252 
Canada CPI 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Canada Real credit 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Canada Real GDP 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Canada Nominal stock prices 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Canada Bond Yield 1950 Q1 2017 Q2 270 
Chile CPI 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Chile Real credit 1950 Q4 2019 Q4 277 
Chile Real GDP 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Chile Nominal stock prices 1953 Q1 2019 Q4 268 
Colombia CPI 1952 Q4 2019 Q4 269 
Colombia Real credit 1952 Q4 2019 Q4 269 
Costa Rica CPI 1950 Q4 2019 Q4 277 
Costa Rica Real credit 1950 Q4 2019 Q4 277 
Cyprus CPI 1957 Q1 2019 Q4 252 
Cyprus Real credit 1958 Q1 2019 Q4 248 
Denmark CPI 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Denmark Real credit 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Denmark Real GDP 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Denmark Nominal stock prices 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Denmark Bond Yield 1955 Q1 2019 Q4 260 
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El Salvador CPI 1957 Q1 2019 Q4 252 
Finland CPI 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Finland Real credit 1950 Q4 2019 Q4 277 
Finland Real GDP 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Finland Nominal stock prices 1951 Q1 2019 Q4 276 
France CPI 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
France Real credit 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
France Real GDP 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
France Nominal stock prices 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
France Bond Yield 1955 Q1 2017 Q2 250 
Germany CPI 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Germany Real credit 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Germany Real GDP 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Germany Nominal stock prices 1953 Q1 2019 Q4 268 
Germany Bond Yield 1957 Q1 2017 Q2 242 
Greece CPI 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Greece Real credit 1953 Q4 2019 Q4 265 
Greece Real GDP 1950 Q2 2019 Q4 279 
Guatemala CPI 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Guatemala Real credit 1950 Q4 2019 Q4 277 
Honduras CPI 1950 Q4 2019 Q4 277 
Honduras Real credit 1950 Q4 2019 Q4 277 
Iceland CPI 1955 Q1 2019 Q4 260 
Iceland Real credit 1955 Q1 2018 Q4 256 
Iceland Real GDP 1957 Q2 2019 Q4 251 
India CPI 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
India Real credit 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
India Real GDP 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
India Nominal stock prices 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Ireland CPI 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Ireland Real credit 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Ireland Real GDP 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Ireland Nominal stock prices 1955 Q1 2019 Q4 260 
Ireland Bond Yield 1957 Q1 2017 Q2 242 
Israel CPI 1951 Q4 2019 Q4 273 
Israel Real credit 1951 Q4 2019 Q4 273 
Israel Real GDP 1957 Q1 2019 Q4 252 
Israel Nominal stock prices 1955 Q1 2019 Q4 260 
Italy CPI 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Italy Real credit 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Italy Real GDP 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Italy Nominal stock prices 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Italy Bond Yield 1955 Q1 2019 Q4 260 
Japan CPI 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Japan Real credit 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Japan Real GDP 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Japan Nominal stock prices 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Japan Bond Yield 1950 Q1 2017 Q2 270 
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Korea CPI 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Korea Real credit 1951 Q4 2019 Q4 273 
Korea Real GDP 1957 Q1 2019 Q4 252 
Luxembourg CPI 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Luxembourg Real GDP 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Malaysia CPI 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Malaysia Real credit 1952 Q4 2019 Q4 269 
Malta CPI 1957 Q1 2019 Q4 252 
Mexico CPI 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Mexico Real credit 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Mexico Real GDP 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Mexico Nominal stock prices 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Morocco CPI 1957 Q1 2019 Q4 252 
Morocco Real credit 1959 Q1 2019 Q4 244 
Morocco Real GDP 1957 Q1 2019 Q4 252 
Netherlands CPI 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Netherlands Real credit 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Netherlands Real GDP 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Netherlands Nominal stock prices 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Netherlands Bond Yield 1955 Q1 2019 Q2 258 
New Zealand CPI 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
New Zealand Real credit 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
New Zealand Real GDP 1957 Q1 2019 Q4 252 
New Zealand Nominal stock prices 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
New Zealand Bond Yield 1957 Q1 2019 Q4 252 
Norway CPI 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Norway Real credit 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Norway Real GDP 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Norway Nominal stock prices 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Norway Bond Yield 1957 Q1 2019 Q4 252 
Pakistan CPI 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Pakistan Real credit 1950 Q4 2019 Q4 277 
Pakistan Real GDP 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Peru CPI 1950 Q4 2019 Q4 277 
Peru Real credit 1950 Q4 2019 Q4 277 
Peru Nominal stock prices 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Philippines CPI 1950 Q4 2019 Q4 277 
Philippines Real credit 1950 Q4 2019 Q4 277 
Philippines Real GDP 1963 Q1 2019 Q4 228 
Philippines Nominal stock prices 1953 Q1 2019 Q4 268 
Portugal CPI 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Portugal Real credit 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Portugal Real GDP 1955 Q1 2019 Q4 260 
Portugal Bond Yield 1955 Q1 2017 Q2 250 
South Africa CPI 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
South Africa Real credit 1950 Q4 2019 Q4 277 
South Africa Real GDP 1957 Q1 2019 Q4 252 
South Africa Nominal stock prices 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
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South Africa Bond Yield 1955 Q1 2019 Q4 260 
Spain CPI 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Spain Real credit 1953 Q4 2019 Q4 265 
Spain Real GDP 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Spain Nominal stock prices 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Sweden CPI 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Sweden Real credit 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Sweden Real GDP 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Sweden Nominal stock prices 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Sweden Bond Yield 1955 Q1 2017 Q2 250 
Switzerland CPI 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Switzerland Real credit 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Switzerland Real GDP 1955 Q1 2019 Q4 260 
Switzerland Nominal stock prices 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Switzerland Bond Yield 1955 Q1 2019 Q4 260 
Taiwan CPI 1957 Q1 2019 Q4 252 
Taiwan Real credit 1957 Q1 2018 Q4 248 
Taiwan Real GDP 1957 Q1 2019 Q4 252 
Thailand CPI 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
Thailand Real credit 1950 Q4 2019 Q4 277 
Turkey CPI 1950 Q4 2019 Q4 277 
Turkey Real credit 1950 Q4 2019 Q4 277 
Turkey Real GDP 1957 Q1 2019 Q4 252 
United Kingdom CPI 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
United Kingdom Real credit 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
United Kingdom Real GDP 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
United Kingdom Nominal stock prices 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
United Kingdom Bond Yield 1955 Q1 2019 Q4 260 
United States CPI 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
United States Real credit 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
United States Real GDP 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
United States Nominal stock prices 1950 Q1 2019 Q4 280 
United States Bond Yield 1953 Q2 2019 Q4 267 
Uruguay CPI 1950 Q4 2019 Q4 277 
Uruguay Real credit 1950 Q4 2019 Q4 277 
Uruguay Real GDP 1957 Q1 2019 Q4 252 
 
 
Table A2. Variables and Transformations 
Original Transformation Definition 
Real GDP (𝒙𝟏𝒕) ∆log (𝑥1 ) Real GDP growth (q-o-q) 
CPI (𝒙𝟐𝒕) ∆ log (𝑥2 ) Inflation growth (q-o-q) 
Credit (𝒙𝟑𝒕) ∆log (𝑥3 /𝑥2 ) Real credit growth (q-o-q) 
Stock price (𝒙𝟒𝒕) ∆log (𝑥4 ) Stock returns (q-o-q) 




Table A3: Descriptive statistics of the variables after transformations 
Country Variable Mean Sd Min Max 
Argentina Real credit 0.01 0.11 -0.91 0.61 
Argentina Real GDP 0.01 0.02 -0.08 0.08 
Argentina CPI 0 0.16 -1.52 0.94 
Australia Real credit 0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.06 
Australia Real GDP 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.04 
Australia CPI 0 0.01 -0.04 0.05 
Australia Nominal stock prices 0.01 0.08 -0.49 0.2 
Australia Bond yield -0.02 0.48 -1.65 1.83 
Austria Real credit 0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.08 
Austria Real GDP 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.04 
Austria CPI 0 0.02 -0.13 0.08 
Austria Nominal stock prices 0.01 0.09 -0.61 0.45 
Belgium Real credit 0.01 0.02 -0.07 0.1 
Belgium Real GDP 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.04 
Belgium CPI 0 0.01 -0.02 0.02 
Belgium Nominal stock prices 0.01 0.07 -0.37 0.21 
Belgium Bond yield -0.02 0.34 -1.39 1.09 
Bolivia Real credit 0.02 0.1 -0.58 0.71 
Bolivia CPI 0 0.13 -1.04 0.69 
Brazil Real credit 0.02 0.07 -0.41 0.34 
Brazil Real GDP 0.01 0.02 -0.08 0.07 
Brazil CPI 0 0.11 -1.15 0.49 
Canada Real credit 0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.08 
Canada Real GDP 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.03 
Canada CPI 0 0.01 -0.03 0.02 
Canada Nominal stock prices 0.01 0.07 -0.37 0.19 
Canada Bond yield -0.01 0.47 -2.19 2.15 
Chile Real credit 0.03 0.08 -0.34 0.54 
Chile Real GDP 0.01 0.02 -0.14 0.11 
Chile CPI 0 0.07 -0.45 0.39 
Chile Nominal stock prices 0.07 0.16 -0.38 0.88 
Colombia Real credit 0.01 0.04 -0.19 0.13 
Colombia CPI 0 0.04 -0.22 0.22 
Costa Rica Real credit 0.01 0.04 -0.18 0.13 
Costa Rica CPI 0 0.02 -0.11 0.06 
Cyprus Real credit 0.02 0.03 -0.16 0.13 
Cyprus CPI 0 0.02 -0.06 0.05 
Denmark Real credit 0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.07 
Denmark Real GDP 0.01 0.01 -0.08 0.06 
Denmark CPI 0 0.01 -0.04 0.04 
Denmark Nominal stock prices 0.02 0.08 -0.39 0.3 
Denmark Bond yield -0.03 0.63 -3.34 2.75 
El Salvador CPI 0 0.02 -0.05 0.05 
Finland Real credit 0.01 0.02 -0.05 0.14 
Finland Real GDP 0.01 0.01 -0.07 0.05 
Finland CPI 0 0.01 -0.04 0.04 
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Finland Nominal stock prices 0.02 0.1 -0.35 0.42 
France Real credit 0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.08 
France Real GDP 0.01 0.01 -0.05 0.08 
France CPI 0 0.01 -0.02 0.01 
France Nominal stock prices 0.01 0.08 -0.33 0.23 
France Bond yield -0.02 0.42 -1.62 1.81 
Germany Real credit 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.05 
Germany Real GDP 0.01 0.01 -0.05 0.04 
Germany CPI 0 0.01 -0.02 0.03 
Germany Nominal stock prices 0.01 0.08 -0.32 0.23 
Germany Bond yield -0.03 0.37 -1.37 1.07 
Greece Real credit 0.01 0.03 -0.07 0.1 
Greece Real GDP 0.01 0.02 -0.05 0.08 
Greece CPI 0 0.03 -0.07 0.07 
Guatemala Real credit 0.01 0.11 -1.44 0.58 
Guatemala CPI 0 0.02 -0.08 0.09 
Honduras Real credit 0.02 0.03 -0.1 0.12 
Honduras CPI 0 0.02 -0.06 0.05 
Iceland Real credit 0.01 0.05 -0.15 0.28 
Iceland Real GDP 0.01 0.02 -0.09 0.1 
Iceland CPI 0 0.03 -0.15 0.12 
India Real credit 0.02 0.04 -0.11 0.15 
India Real GDP 0.01 0.02 -0.07 0.09 
India CPI 0 0.03 -0.13 0.09 
India Nominal stock prices 0.02 0.11 -0.64 0.37 
Ireland Real credit 0.01 0.03 -0.1 0.11 
Ireland Real GDP 0.01 0.02 -0.06 0.21 
Ireland CPI 0 0.01 -0.07 0.04 
Ireland Nominal stock prices 0.02 0.09 -0.49 0.35 
Ireland Bond yield -0.02 0.66 -2.19 2.4 
Israel Real credit 0.03 0.05 -0.17 0.45 
Israel Real GDP 0.01 0.02 -0.12 0.1 
Israel CPI 0 0.04 -0.3 0.23 
Israel Nominal stock prices 0.05 0.14 -0.84 0.61 
Italy Real credit 0.01 0.03 -0.05 0.09 
Italy Real GDP 0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.1 
Italy CPI 0 0.01 -0.05 0.04 
Italy Nominal stock prices 0.01 0.1 -0.3 0.35 
Italy Bond yield -0.02 0.56 -2.3 2.34 
Japan Real credit 0.01 0.02 -0.07 0.08 
Japan Real GDP 0.01 0.01 -0.05 0.03 
Japan CPI 0 0.01 -0.04 0.05 
Japan Nominal stock prices 0.01 0.08 -0.36 0.22 
Japan Bond yield -0.03 0.35 -1.22 1.5 
Korea Real credit 0.03 0.04 -0.13 0.19 
Korea Real GDP 0.02 0.02 -0.07 0.08 
Korea CPI 0 0.03 -0.13 0.17 
Luxembourg Real GDP 0.01 0.02 -0.05 0.06 
 49
Luxembourg CPI 0 0.01 -0.03 0.02 
Malaysia Real credit 0.03 0.04 -0.07 0.24 
Malaysia CPI 0 0.01 -0.06 0.03 
Malta CPI 0 0.02 -0.04 0.05 
Mexico Real credit 0.01 0.06 -0.31 0.28 
Mexico Real GDP 0.01 0.02 -0.06 0.08 
Mexico CPI 0 0.03 -0.22 0.09 
Mexico Nominal stock prices 0.05 0.15 -0.72 0.7 
Morocco Real credit 0.02 0.04 -0.13 0.12 
Morocco Real GDP 0.01 0.03 -0.14 0.17 
Morocco CPI 0 0.02 -0.07 0.04 
Netherlands Real credit 0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.08 
Netherlands Real GDP 0.01 0.01 -0.05 0.06 
Netherlands CPI 0 0.01 -0.06 0.04 
Netherlands Nominal stock prices 0.01 0.08 -0.42 0.17 
Netherlands Bond yield -0.02 0.37 -1.23 1.31 
New Zealand Real credit 0.01 0.04 -0.12 0.17 
New Zealand Real GDP 0.01 0.02 -0.08 0.11 
New Zealand CPI 0 0.01 -0.06 0.05 
New Zealand Nominal stock prices 0.01 0.08 -0.44 0.23 
New Zealand Bond yield -0.02 0.61 -2.33 4.35 
Norway Real credit 0.01 0.02 -0.05 0.08 
Norway Real GDP 0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.04 
Norway CPI 0 0.01 -0.05 0.06 
Norway Nominal stock prices 0.02 0.1 -0.51 0.34 
Norway Bond yield -0.01 0.37 -1.45 1.56 
Pakistan Real credit 0.02 0.06 -0.21 0.24 
Pakistan Real GDP 0.01 0.02 -0.05 0.09 
Pakistan CPI 0 0.02 -0.1 0.11 
Peru Real credit 0.02 0.08 -0.52 0.34 
Peru CPI 0 0.15 -1.56 1.23 
Peru Nominal stock prices 0.08 0.35 -0.47 3.37 
Philippines Real credit 0.02 0.05 -0.23 0.13 
Philippines Real GDP 0.02 0.11 -0.1 1.62 
Philippines CPI 0 0.03 -0.12 0.11 
Philippines Nominal stock prices 0.01 0.13 -0.36 1.09 
Portugal Real credit 0.01 0.03 -0.07 0.07 
Portugal Real GDP 0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.06 
Portugal CPI 0 0.02 -0.08 0.06 
Portugal Bond yield 0 0.72 -3.76 3.07 
South Africa Real credit 0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.09 
South Africa Real GDP 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.05 
South Africa CPI 0 0.01 -0.04 0.03 
South Africa Nominal stock prices 0.02 0.09 -0.26 0.24 
South Africa Bond yield 0.02 0.61 -2.07 3.39 
Spain Real credit 0.01 0.02 -0.07 0.08 
Spain Real GDP 0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.04 
Spain CPI 0 0.01 -0.04 0.04 
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Spain Nominal stock prices 0.01 0.09 -0.28 0.36 
Sweden Real credit 0.01 0.02 -0.06 0.06 
Sweden Real GDP 0.01 0.01 -0.04 0.03 
Sweden CPI 0 0.01 -0.04 0.03 
Sweden Nominal stock prices 0.02 0.09 -0.29 0.33 
Sweden Bond yield -0.02 0.45 -1.76 2.06 
Switzerland Real credit 0.01 0.01 -0.05 0.05 
Switzerland Real GDP 0.01 0.01 -0.05 0.03 
Switzerland CPI 0 0.01 -0.02 0.03 
Switzerland Nominal stock prices 0.01 0.07 -0.34 0.16 
Switzerland Bond yield -0.02 0.27 -0.82 0.87 
Taiwan Real credit 0.02 0.03 -0.14 0.12 
Taiwan Real GDP 0.02 0.02 -0.05 0.08 
Taiwan CPI 0 0.02 -0.16 0.08 
Thailand Real credit 0.02 0.03 -0.09 0.13 
Thailand CPI 0 0.02 -0.06 0.08 
Turkey Real credit 0.02 0.06 -0.25 0.18 
Turkey Real GDP 0.01 0.02 -0.11 0.07 
Turkey CPI 0 0.04 -0.2 0.14 
United Kingdom Real credit 0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.07 
United Kingdom Real GDP 0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.05 
United Kingdom CPI 0 0.01 -0.08 0.04 
United Kingdom Nominal stock prices 0.02 0.08 -0.27 0.35 
United Kingdom Bond yield -0.02 0.54 -1.88 1.76 
United States Real credit 0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.04 
United States Real GDP 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.04 
United States CPI 0 0.01 -0.04 0.02 
United States Nominal stock prices 0.02 0.06 -0.36 0.19 
United States Bond yield -0.01 0.46 -2.45 1.54 
Uruguay Real credit 0 0.07 -0.31 0.22 
Uruguay Real GDP 0.01 0.02 -0.07 0.09 



















factor (2 stage) 
Financial factor 
(PC1) 
1 0.98 -0.88 -0.98 
Financial factor 
(2 stage) 
0.98 1 -0.89 -0.99 
Macroeconomic 
factor (PC1) 




-0.98 -0.99 0.93 1 
 
 
Table A5. Cross-section variables 
Country 
Credit/ GDP (%) Market Cap./GDP (%) US inv./GDP (%) 
Mean N Mean N Max N 
Argentina 16.44 58 10.86 43 10.04 31 
Australia 65.1 60 79.36 41 13.25 30 
Austria 90.24 19 17.74 45 4.43 31 
Belgium 61.95 19 46.02 44 13.27 31 
Bolivia 29.15 60   6.1 31 
Brazil 41.07 60 49.3 20 6.2 31 
Canada 64.04 49 108.49 41 23.26 31 
Chile 44.14 60 95.97 29 14.83 31 
Colombia 28.23 60 45.84 15 4.45 31 
Costa Rica 30 60 6.45 18 15.21 31 
Cyprus 193 19 25.72 14 23.48 30 
Denmark 81.41 54 29.21 30 5.4 30 
El Salvador 34.73 55   17.58 31 
Finland 81.15 19 63.67 22 1.39 30 
France 90.71 19 48.45 44 3.37 31 
Germany 92.08 19 32.13 45 3.84 31 
Greece 89.29 19 37.06 19 0.79 31 
Guatemala 19.18 60   4.61 31 
Honduras 30.03 60   8.61 31 
Iceland 72.1 60   3.4 14 
India 26.94 60 76.27 17 1.75 30 
Ireland 98.38 19 51.83 22 135.64 31 
Israel 52.25 60 49.75 41 7.98 31 
Italy 50.44 30 45.69 10 2.05 31 
Japan 119.36 60 70.48 45 2.59 31 
Korea 65.03 60 47.69 40 2.63 31 
Luxembourg 56.23 30 104.14 45 1095.82 31 
Malaysia 78.15 60 132.34 39 7.74 31 
Malta 57.2 26 43.01 20 21.5 18 
Mexico 21.12 60 21.19 44 9.34 31 
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Morocco 31.49 56 55.38 10 0.7 31 
Netherlands 71.03 30 66.59 43 111.54 31 
New Zealand 63.4 60 38.94 35 10.6 31 
Norway 62.94 60 40.37 39 8.5 31 
Pakistan 22.24 60 21.94 24 0.96 30 
Peru 18.04 60 37.78 23 7.47 31 
Philippines 28.47 60 58.04 24 7.34 31 
Portugal 81.5 30 23.07 42 2.3 30 
Singapore 77.43 60 166.79 41 85.84 31 
South Africa 52.37 59 167.8 45 2.88 31 
Spain 84.2 30 48.1 44 5.37 31 
Sweden 62.66 60 48.19 29 11.29 31 
Switzerland 126.4 57 142.54 45 37.09 31 
Taiwan     5.09 30 
Thailand 70.51 60 66.1 31 5.79 31 
Turkey 25.24 60 24.86 27 0.82 31 
United Kingdom 83.1 60 86.3 34 30.54 31 
Uruguay 27.63 60 4.06 2 5.09 30 
Note: N denotes the annual non-missing sample size available for each indicator. Time spam for Credit/ GDP 






























Figure A1. Original series, transformed series and unit root tests  
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